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Abstract:
The three Baltic countries show many similarities in the development of new ownership structures,
but they have followed different paths of privatization and this has to some extent resulted in
differences in the structures of enterprise governance. The first part of the paper describes the
privatization process in each of the three Balic countries. The process is divided into different
stages dominated by different privatization methods. It is shown how these differen  methods have
resulted in different ownership structures in each stage. These descriptive sections are summarized
with comparative overviews which also include the main elements in the institutional framework
for corporate governance.
In the second part of the paper the resulting ownership structures are described, and it is shown
how these struct res have changed after the initial privatization. All three countries have a quite
high degree of both management ownership and broader employee ownership. This was especially
the case for the early stage of privatization and concerned mainly small and medium sized
enterprises with quite low capital intensity. For Lithuania also larger and more capital intensive
enterprises were taken over by a broad group of employees. Estonia has been the fastest to
promote significant foreign investment, but the other countries have been catching up th  latest
years. Some of the differences have been leveled off in the dynamic changes of ownership
structures. The strongest change has been managers taking over the ownership from other
employees.
Finally, findings from our studies on the relationships between ownership and economic
performance are presented. Foreign owned enterprises takes the lead when it concerns pro-active
restructuring: developing new markets, new products and new production methods. They have
a high capital intensity and this has not yet paid off. Profitability is l wer and factor productivity
on the same level as in insider owned enterprises although foreign ownership have advantages in
management and easy access to internaional m rket networks. Insider owned enterprises have
more defensive restructuring with some downsizing, relatively low wages, problems of getting
bank-loans, relatively low investments. However, at the same time they can show relatively good
results on profitability and factor productivity. Compared to domestic outside owned enterprises
insider ownership are doing surprisingly well in most measure  across the three countries.
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11.  Introduction
The experience in Eastern Europe shows that there is a clear connection between the
different methods of privatization and resulting ownership structures in privatized enterprises.
Ownership structure here refers to the distribution of ownership rights held by different groups
of owners / stakeholders in relation to the enterprise. Different stakeholders - including managers,
other employees, domestic persons, domestic non-financial enterprises, domestic financial
enterprises and foreign enterprises - often have quite different objectives. In addition they possess
different resources, such as capital, technological knowledge, management knowledge, and access
to networks.
In this paper emphasis will be put on insider ownership which can be divided in management
ownership and employee ownership when owned by a broad of employees. Both management and
employee ownership have been important elements in the development of new ownership
structures in the Baltic countries. At the same time insider ownership has been taken as an obstacle
for restructuring of enterprises (Carlin and Landesman, 1997; Pohl et al., 1997, Frydman et al.,
1997). We will also put emphasis on the development of foreign ownership which in contrast to
insider ownership has been taken as a guarantee for restructuring because foreign investors have
strong resources of capital, management and technological skills, as well as access to international
supplier and distribution networks.
 The rights in relation to the enterprise are not only derived from ownership of enterprise
assets. In addition we need to take account of the role of legislation, giving other types of rights
to different stakeholders. The development of legislation and enforcement of company code, rules
on trade of ownership rights, bankruptcy legislation etc. often play important roles in influencing
for the distribution of rights and thus for the development of corporate governance.
The ownership structure of a given enterprise is determined by the privatization methods
interacting with the specific conditions in the enterprise (size, capital-intensity etc) and the
resources of the potential new owners. Privatization will often favor a special group of
stakeholders, and this group might or might not want to exchange these rights with another group
of stakeholders. Such a change of ownership depends on the possibilities and conditions for
trading - on the development of the market for ownership. The capital market plays an important
role in this context. Some methods of privatization can help to develop the stock exchange by
developing the regulatory framework and by boosting the trading of vouchers and shares on the
stock exchange.
The institutional framework, legislation on registration of ownership, the development of
the stock exchange, the transparency and quality of information  on enterprise performance are
important elements behind the change of ownership after privatization. Some groups who have
acquired shares because of special preferential opportunities might want to change their portfolio.
The possibilities of change thus depend on their preferred portfolio composition and on the
possibilities for making this adjustment. This paper will include an analysis of the change in the
distribution of ownership after privatization.
The governance structure is a question about who takes the decisions and what are the
incentives for different groups to supply their resources and effort in improving the efficiency of
the enterprises. The test of how the governance structure is functioning is the economic
2performance of the enterprises. In the context of transitional economies it is of special interest to
evaluate their progress in restructuring the enterprises - to develop new products, production
methods and markets. In this paper we will not make a deep analysis of restructuring, but
summarize the preliminary results on our data for the three Baltic countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next three sections we will describe the
privatization process in each of the Baltic countries. The process is divided into different stages
dominated by different privatization methods. We will show how these different methods have
resulted in different ownership structures in each stage. These descriptive sections end with
comparative overviews also including the main elements in the institutional framework for
corporate governance. In the following sections for each country we will analyze the resulting
ownership structures, how these structures have changed after initial privatization, and finally
present findings on the relationships between ownership and economic performance.
2. The privatization process in Estonia
2.1 Stages of privatization - organization and legislation
Privatization in Estonia may be divided in three stages. Early privatization, small
privatization, and large privatization mainly based on tenders.
The first stage of early privatization began in all three Baltic countries in the Soviet period
before full independence in August 1991. The first private enterprises were the result of the
liberalization following the perestrojka policy of Gorbatjov and included small individual
enterprises, cooperatives, and joint ventures. For Estonia the first early privatization was related
to perestrojka experiments on Asmall state enterprises@ dating back to 1987. In the late 1980´s and
especially in 1990-91 the Baltic States already had started their own economic legislation. In this
period further early developments in privatization are evident, making it difficult to define a strict
borderline between early quite unauthorized or spontaneous privatization and more regulated
development in later stages. In Estonia an economic reform program was introduced in 1989. This
included the proposal for so-called APeople´s enterprises@.
In October 1990 the Department of State Property in the Ministry of Economy was founded
to supervise the development of privatization including auctions of small scale enterprises which
began in March 1991. The basic law of fundamentals of ownership reform enacted in June 1991
gave priority to restitution and voucher privatization. However, this part of privatization was
postponed and the most important part of the privatization in the early years of transition turned
out to be small privatization based on legislation from December 1990. In the first years this
privatization of small enterprises was governed by the Department of State Property in
cooperation with local municipalities.
After September 1992 a more independent unit was established: The Estonian Privatization
Enterprise with support from the German Treuhandanstalt. The authority of this agency was
developed further in the general law on privatization introduced in June 1993. The Estonian
Privatization Enterprise was merged with the Department of State Property and the name changed
to Estonian Privatization Agency. While the June 1993 law contained the remaining provisions for
parts of small privatization, its prime aim was to define the rules for large tender privatization,
which can be considered as the third and last stage of privatization in Estonia.   
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Box 2.1  Estonia - enterprise privatization - organization and legislation
 
Organization
- Department of State Property, Ministry of Economy, founded October 1990
  to carry out small and pilot privatization
- September 1992 The Estonian Privatization Enterprise (EPE) starts activities
  with support from experts from the German Treuhandanstalt
- September 1993 The Estonian Privatization Agency (merging EPE and DSP)
  diminished ambiguity on responsibility and increased centralized authority,
  EPA responsible for both small privatization and large privatization
Main legislation:
1986/1987 - Resolutions 43/1986 and 91/1987,  small state enterprises in Estonia
December1989Charter on Peoples Enterprises
September1990Law on leasing
December 1990The Law on Small Scale Privatization
June 1991Law on the Basis of Property Reform - restitution, vouchers
September1991  Law foreign investment - ensures repatriation of profits
October 1991Land Reform act - reprivatization of land
May 1992Amendments to Law on Small Privatization
September1992  Bankruptcy law - strict, c editors get strong position
September1992  Parliament resolution on tender of large enterprises, EPA
April 1993  Foreigners allowed to buy land with production facilities
June 1993  Privatization Law - small and large unified - EPA
June 1994  Free voucher trade among Estonian residents and companies
August1994 Procedure for public offerings and investment funds
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.2  Early Privatization in Estonia
Early legislation in the Soviet period, before full independence in August 1991, favored
insiders. The first transformation of state ownership started in 1987 in the form of Asmall state
owned enterprises@. By 1989 there were 461 small state owned enterprises with nearly 6000
employees (Venesaar, 1991 p. 44) and in July 1991 the Ministry of Economics had registered 705
of this type of semi-private enterprise. Most of these were initiated and controlled by a large state
owned enterprise, and often it was the start of a spin off to a private enterprise mainly controlled
by people from management in the initiating enterprise. According to Frydman et al. (1993, p.
147) many of the successful Estonian entrepreneurs first established their businesses as Asmall state
enterprises@. Compared to other parts of the Soviet Union also A ew co peratives@ developed
quite early and rapidly. By January, 1990, there were more than 2000 new cooperatives with about
7% of employment (Arkadie et al., 1991, p. 258). The number of cooperatives peaked in 1993.
According to the Statistical Office of Estonia there were 2943 cooperatives in August 1993.  Since
5then many cooperatives have been transformed to other legal forms In July 1998 there were 2124
cooperatives in the enterprise register, but only 769 of them were registered as profit earning
cooperatives (ESA 1998).
Some of the first cases of employee ownership in this early stage of privatization in Estonia
were leased enterprises established under the Soviet legislation of 1989. According to Terk (1996,
p. 120) there were 12 large enterprises mainly with Russian employees which formed a lease
system under Soviet law. The Soviet law gave the right to lease the enterprise to the work
collective. An option to buy was also included and we assume that most of these enterprises were
taken over by insiders. In July 1991 this law was changed to Estonian rules and around 200 of
such enterprises were leased according to the new rules. The new rules also opened up for leasing
by the management and by outsiders. According to Terk (1996 p. 199) management take-overs
were favored by the state bureaucracy. The leasing option was stopped by 1993 and most of the
leased enterprises were gradually changed to full ownership most often by the leaseholder.
The early reform program also favored so-called "peoples enterprises" which included a type
of experimental leasing system for  insiders. By 1991 only 7 large enterprises had been taken over
mainly by insiders. Five of these firms  had full employee ownership (Terk, 1996).
In the early period take-overs by foreign companies was not widespread. However, as with
new cooperatives, Estonians were also the most active in the former Soviet Union in using the
possibilities for creating joint ventures. The first joint ventures were established in Estonia already
in 1987. There were 11 joint ventures in 1988 and 320 by the end of 1992 (Purju, 1996).
2.3  Small privatization in Estonia
After Estonian independence in August 1991 the political climate changed and a strategy
emphasizing  employee ownership was no longer in favor. Thus while the initial legislation on
small privatization introduced in spring 1991 favored insiders, after May 1992 most of these
preferences were at least formally taken away. In the early version of the law employees had the
right to buy the enterprise for the Ainitial price@ which in most cases was much below the market
value of the assets. It is estimated that around 80% of the first wave of 450 small enterprises were
taken over by insiders before the change in policy (Kein & Tali, 1994).  Subsequently, while
insider ownership still continued to be an element in the privatization process, its importance fell.
In the bidding process insiders had now the opportunity to match the final bid. Furthermore, with
the amendment of May 1992 the circle of participants in privatization was widened to include
foreigners (Männik, 1997). In the general law on Privatization from June 1993 the last privileges
of insiders were taken away
Figure 2.3   Small privatization in Estonia  (objects sold by auction)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
objects 211* 556* 252 126 120 84 64 20 1433
price          mill EEK 1.7* 42* 128 68 80 149 161 287 917
av. price   1000 EEK 8* 76* 508 540 666 1774 2516 14350 678
6av. price  1000 1995 EEK 312 276 970 697 666 1442 1838 3689 659
*1991 and 1992 data from Purju 1996, other years from EPA. 1991 price was 18 mill Rubles.
EPA estimates the total number of object 1991-98 to 1367 for a total price of 893 mill EEK.
The control of the privatization process including small privatization was taken over by the
Estonian Privatization Agency (EPA) in 1993. The development in sales can be found in figure
2.3. In this stage of small privatization the method of sale by auction included relatively small
objects often split off from larger companies. However, the price per object increased considerably
during the period, and since the June 1993 law there were no formal limit of the asset value for
sale on auctions. From this time the distinction between small and large privatization was a
question of method more than a question of size.
From table 2.3 it can be seen that small privatization proceeded very rapidly in the first
years, when the assets were sold for very low prices. Note, however, that the increase in average
price especially in the early years also due to inflation. Compare in figure 2.3 with the average
price 1995 EEK, deflated by CPI. In the later years the increase is caused by the fact that it was
another type of objects sold: fixed assets spinn-offs from enterprises in large privatization. The
small privatization was very fast in the early years. Already in 1994 83% of the activities in the
service sector, 90% of whole sale and 94% of retail sale were private. In 1991 more than 90% of
the enterprises in the service and trade sector had belonged to the state or municipalities (Purju
1996).
2.4  Large privatization through EPA
From 1993 the strategy for large privatization changed to resemble the German
Treuhandanstalt model. The Estonian Privatization Agency put out large enterprises for open
tender, often announced internationally. The offered price was only one of the criteria for choosing
the buyer, though employees were not given any preferential treatment. Also the proposed
business plan and guarantees for investments and employment played an important role. In this
model the main idea was to find a core investor. Since substantial capital was needed, foreign
capital had an advantage in this process. Also at this stage, since the managerial group often had
accumulated some capital, it was possible for them to begin to secure loans in the rapidly
developing system of private banks. Furthermore, domestic capital suppliers were allowed to buy
on installment and it was also possible for domestic buyers to use vouchers as part of the payment
from summer 1994. Hence, at this stage, alliances between managers and a broad group of
employees were no longer necessary. In addition, foreign capital gained increasing access during
this stage of large privatization. From spring 1996 they were also allowed to buy on installment
and to use vouchers as payment (Kein and Terk, 1997). Only in rare cases did broad groups of
employees have the opportunity to take over their enterprises in this type of privatization.
The Treuhandanstalt model gained speed during 1993, and the largest number of
privatization contracts for large enterprises was made in 1994, see figure 2.4-1. At the end of 1995
most large enterprises had been privatized. However, this type of tender privatization has
continued since then so that by 1999 only a few though quite large enterprises remained. At the
end of 1998, 483 large enterprises had been sold through EPA by direct sale at a total price of
7around 4.7 bill EEK or 400 mill USD. The investment guarantees amounted to 4.6 bill EEK and
the owners took over liabilities for 2.2 bill EEK. The table shows a tendency for fewer, but larger
and more expensive enterprise privatizations, between 1994-97.
The bulk of enterprises in the large tender privatization were industrial companies. The share
of the private sector in industry thus gives an indication of the speed of this privatization:
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (1999) the private share of industrial sales
increased from 33.8% in the first quarter of 1994 to 65% in the first quarter of 1996 to 84% in the
end of 1998.
Figure 2.4-1  Overview over Large privatization by tender in Estonia - total
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
enterprises 54 215 142 43 17 12 483
price                  mill EEK
average price   1000 EEK
353
6.5
1329
6.2
937
6.6
474
11.0
1295
76.2
318
26.5
4707
9.7
total paid by vouchers
percent paid by vouchers
0
0%
294
22%
443
47%
134
28%
298*
23%
76
24%
1245
26%
debt taken over mill EEK
average debt    1000 EEK
196
3.6
700
3.3
618
4.4
230
5.3
416
24.5
8
0.7
2168
4.5
invest. guarantees mEEK
average            1000
EEK
237
4.4
858
4.0
1021
7.2
489
11.3
1715
100.9
281
23.4
4601
9.5
job guarantees
average
9099
169
25573
119
17279
122
12742
30
2929
172
72
6
56226
116
* 50% paid by  vouchers, excepts the shipping comp. sold for 700 mill EEK to Norwegian company.
Table 2.4-2 shows that foreign dominated take-overs played a considerable role already
from the start of the tender privatization in 1993, and this role increased over time. For 1997 and
1998 foreign capital paid more than 50% of the total revenue for EPA and over the period 1993-
98 foreign capital paid 31% of the revenue. In the first years the estimate of foreign take-overs
might have been slightly underestimated. Before late spring 1996 (Kein and Terk, 1997) they could
not pay by installment and use vouchers as was the case with domestic buyers, thus giving an
incentive to have domestic investors formally involved (Purju 1998). In the first years installment
could cover up to 80%.
From spring 1994 it was made possible to pay up to 50% of the price by vouchers and the
compulsory initial payment was increased from 20% to 50% of the price.  Most privatizations after
June 1994 exploited the opportunity of 50% payment by vouchers. However, the overall average
figure is considerably lower because some of the largest privatizations, especially by foreigners,
did not use vouchers. (According to the information provided by EPA already by 1995 foreign
8take-overs paid on average 33% by vouchers and vouchers were used in 3 out of the 5 enterprises
taken over by foreign capital).
Employment guarantees played a minor role in the foreign take-overs especially in the later
years. Over the whole period foreigners took over liabilities to a lower extent than was the case
with domestic buyers. On the other hand, foreigners have given much higher investment
guarantees. This is not surprising since one of main advantages of foreign owners is their easier
access to capital.
Figure 2.4-2   Large privatization by tender in Estonia - foreign dominated
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
Enterprises 7 15 5 5 3 6 41 1
total price          mill EEK
average price   1000 EEK
% of total privatized
91
13
26%
108
7.2
8%
77
15.4
8%
208
41.6
44%
740
247
57%
215
35.8
68%
1439
35.1
31%
total paid by vouchers
percent paid by vouchers
0
0%
0
0%
26
33%
5
2%
20
17%
3
1%
54
4%
debt taken over mill EEK
average debt    1000 EEK
% of total privatized
-
-
-
201 2
13.4
29%
56
11.2
9%
129
25.8
56%
109
36.3
26%
0
0
0%
495
12.1
23%
Invest. guarantees mEEK
average            1000
EEK
% of total privatized
87
12
37%
131
8.7
15%
193
38.6
19%
338
67.6
69%
1484
495
87%
134
22.4
48%
2368
57.8
51%
job guarantees
average
% of total privatized
1939
277
21%
2917
194
11%
1460
292
8%
54
11
0%
0
0
0%
0
0
0%
6370
155
11%
Total FDI        mill EEK
Estonians repurchase
Loans, reinvested profits
in new enterprises
in existing enterprises
FDI-priv.+inv.guarantees
% of FDI in existing e.
% of total FDI
2071
-82
918
764
470
178
38%
9%
2789
-23
928
639
1239
239
19%
9%
2313
-27
1146
195
999
270
27%
12%
1814
-420
1599
49
587
546
93%
30%
3694
-415
2333
52
1723
2222
129%
60%
7942
-507
2344
42
6063
349
6%
4%
20623
-1474
9268
1741
11081
3807
34%
18%
Own calculations based on data from Central Bank of Estonia and EPA.
1. The 41 enterprises divided by nationality of investor: 9 Sweden, 9 Finland, 7 USA, 6 Germany, 2 Denmark, 2 UK and
one from each of Canada, Singapore, Holland, Norway, Italy, Russia.
2. of which 197 mill EEK for Kreenholm, bought by Swedish investor, most enterprises no debt taken over.
Since both the actual purchase price and the following investment will be registered as FDI,
9table 2.4-2 shows the importance of privatization for attracting foreign capital in Estonia. Other
flows of FDI are connected to green field investments and to take-overs of existing enterprises
established or privatized by domestic owners. It is difficult to estimate the exact distribution on
these different modes of FDI. Data from The Bank of Estonia and ESA shows that green field
investment are quite high in the early years, but later on take-overs of existing enterprises played
the strongest role. If we take the purchase price plus the investment guarantees as indicators for
the importance of privatization, from table 2.4-2 we can see that privatization related FDI made
up around 34% of FDI in existing enterprises in the period 1993-98 and 18% of total FDI in the
period. There is a steeply increasing trend up to 1997, broken sharply in 1998, but this is mainly
explained by huge Swedish/Finnish investment in the two largest private banks in Estonia in 1998.
If the investment guarantees were spread out for the following three years also a more smooth
increase would emerge.
Most foreign owned enterprises are quite small including many sales outlets and service
entities established to facilitate access to the Estonian market. The initial stage took place when
the Estonians used the possibilities in the new Soviet Joint Venture legislation, see section 2.2. At
the start of 1991 414 foreign owned enterprises were registered in Estonia. By the start of 1993
the number had increased to 3814 (Liuhto, 1995). By July 1996 5857 enterprises or 9.4% of the
total number of enterprises were registered as "foreign property". The investments were strongly
concentrated in the area around Tallinn with 82% of the foreign owned enterprises (ESA, 1996).
Based on the statistical profile for active enterprises (ESA 1998) there were 1981 active foreign
enterprises in 1995 increasing to 2386 in 1997, respectively 6.5% and 6% of the total number of
enterprises. Half of them were in trade and 19% in manufacturing.
Two types of vouchers have been distributed in Estonia. Capital vouchers were distributed
to all residents depending on years of work. Compensation vouchers were distributed to owners
(or their heirs) of property nationalized in the early Soviet period if they did not want this property
back, or if it was not possible to return this property. By the end of 1998 8.3 bill EEK and 7.1
EEK bill compensation vouchers had been distributed (Ministry of Finance). The two types of
vouchers are used in parallel for privatization of real estate and enterprises.
In March 1995 the biggest investment fund crashed implying losses for investors exceeding
the losses incurred during the banking crisis in 1992-93 (Kein, 1995). This was an important
reason why investment funds did not develop like in other countries with voucher schemes.
Investment funds accumulating vouchers did not have any formulated role in the legislation. By
June 1996 there were 6 privatization investment funds, and their  amount of vouchers were only
1% of the total value of distributed vouchers  (Kein and Terk, 1997).
Table 2.4-3 - The use of vouchers in Estonia 
nominal value       mill. EEK 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
housing 500 1979 660 283 120 3542
real estate 0 30 204 470 1342 2046
small enterprises auctions 14 25 75 80 142 336
10
large enterprises tenders 16 726 218 490 243 1693
public offerings 0 704 666 940 0 2310
compensation fund 26 513 528 252 183 1502
total 556 3977 2351 2515 2030 11429
market/nominal vouchervalue 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.35 0.28
based on Ministry of Finance
Vouchers were declared non-tradeable from the start, then during spring of 1994 trade of
vouchers were gradually approved and from August 1994 vouchers were made freely tradeable
(Kein and Tali, 1994 p. 31). At that time the expectations about the real value of vouchers were
quite low, and at the same many poor people were in acute need of cash. Therefore, supply was
high and demand relatively low resulting in a very low market price of the vouchers. As can be
seen from table 2.4-3 the market price of vouchers has been rather volatile. The lowest price was
13% of the nominal value in July 1995. In the later years the price increased somewhat to reach
a maximum of 47% of the nominal value at the end of the stock market boom in the autumn of
1997.
Since 1994 is has been a quite profitable business to buy up vouchers and use them as
substitute for cash in enterprise privatization. Therefore, a considerable concentration of these
owners certificates took place in the years following the distribution of vouchers. This is one
reason why vouchers should not lead to a diversified structure of ownership in Estonia.
Vouchers were primarily used for privatization of housing, but from the end of 1994 it was
also possible to use vouchers for buying minority shares in some large companies of which the
majority of shares had already been sold to a core owner. In fact, only vouchers could be used in
these public offerings of minority shares started in the end of 1994.  The first two - the largest
department store in Tallinn and the brewery SAKU, were sold by fixed price to around 50000
buyers, using 100 mill EEK nominal value of vouchers. In the following offerings the shares were
sold in auctions and a much more limited number of bidders participated. In July 1997 a minority
holding of shares in Eesti Gaas were sold for 406 mill EEK worth of vouchers to 1338 bidders.
By the end of 1997 minority holdings in 39 enterprises had been privatized in this way removing
the value of 2,3 bill. EEK vouchers from circulation. Beside the privatization of housing and
industrial assets vouchers have been and will be massively used for privatization of land and forest.
Until 2003 privatization of land by preemptive restitution rights and by auctions are expected to
absorb 4-5 billion voucher EEK (estimate by the Ministry of Finance).
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Privatization of public utilities and enterprises related to infrastructure started with the
privatization of 66% of the shares in Estonian Air in June 1996. The shares were sold to a Danish
company. In August 1996 part of Estonian Oil was sold to an investor from USA. In 1997 the big
shipping company was sold to a Norwegian investor and in 1998 parts of the energy sector were
privatized.  These privatizations were part of the normal EPA-tender process, but were often
combined with public offerings of minority holdings. In most cases the objects for privatization
were  natural monopolies, therefore, some special state regulation was needed in each case. In
February 1999 49% of Eesti Telekom shares were sold on the domestic and international stock
exchanges.
Already from September 1992 Estonia had implemented a rather tough law on bankruptcy.
Most state owned enterprises were cut off from subsidies and some of them were liquidated and
their assets privatized. 40 medium to large enterprises had been privatized through liquidation at
the end of 1998, and a much larger number of small enterprises had been privatized in this way.
As in other part of the Soviet Union there were only branches of the State Savings Banks,
the Agricultural Bank and the Bank for Foreign Trade to privatize. Most banks were started as
private or semi-private entities quite early in the transition process. In Estonia the state banks were
commercialized and transformed into joint stock companies already prior to monetary reform in
June 1992. According to EPA the public share in banks equity fell from 30% in April 1993 to 23%
in 1994, to 12% in the autumn of 1996. In 1996 a large state-owned insurance company was
privatized (Purju and Teder 1998). In 1998 the two largest Estonian banks were taken over by two
Swedish banks. Swedbank acquires 56% of Hansapank and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 32%
of Eesti Ühispank. According to Sutt (1999) the foreign share of ownership in Estonian banks
increased from 15% of the assets in 1994 to 44% in 1997 and to 61% at the end of 1998.
Quite strict regulation of the banks was implemented early on and Estonia experienced a
serious banking crisis in the early years of transition, 1992-93.  All the insolvent banks, including
the largest bank, were closed down except two which were restructured under guidance of the
central bank. The number of banks fell from around 40 in the summer of 1992 to 20 two years
later (Rajasalu 1994). The tough reaction from the Central Bank was a clear signal to he economic
agent that a hard budget constraint would be enforced. The law on Credit Institutions from 1995
gave authorization for universal banking allowing banks to both own and finance other financial
institutions as well as non-financial enterprises.
The Privatization Agency handles privatization of land for those businesses that have been
privatized through EPA. The legislation on land ownership has been somewhat behind. Prior to
1996 land were not included in the privatization contracts, but the buyers of enterprises obtained
the prerogative rights to privatize the land underneath the enterprise buildings. Therefore, the land
ownership has in many cases been transferred to the new owners later than the building and
equipment. In 1996 169 land purchase agreements for 179 mill EEK had been signed, increasing
to 264 in 1997 and 546 in 1998.
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3. The privatization process in Latvia
3.1 Stages of privatization - organization and legislation
While developments in Latvia have many similarities with those in Estonia, political
developments were more unstable and a political deadlock dominated the situation for some years.
Accordingly, stabilizat on came a little later, liberalization was not so extensive and initially the
privatization process was much slower. The legislative background was rather unclear for the first
years of privatization.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Box 3.1 Latvia - enterprise privatization - organization and legislation
Organization:
May 1991 - November 1991 
Some authority at the Department of State Property Conversion, Ministry of Economy
November 1991 - spring 1994
Decentral model:
municipalities: small privatization - service, trade, catering
different ministries: responsibility in respective fields
ministry of Economic Reforms: some overall guidance
From spring 1994: centralization of privatization at Latvian Privatization Agency (LPA)
 (The State Property Fund managing the ongoing state enterprises)
Main legislation
March 1 1991 decree On State Property and the Basic Principles of its Conversion
privatization and reprivatization of state and municipal property
November 1991 Law on small privatization - amended February 1992
June 1992 Law on large privatization - August, list of large enterprises to be privatized
November 1992 Privatization Certificates (vouchers) - amended May 1994
March 1993 Restitution of Property Rights on Enterprises and other Objects -
amended: March 1995
February 1993 Law on Leasing and Leasing with the Option to Buy
February 1994 Laws on Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Object
                    amendments: June 1994, centralization in Latvian Privatization Agency
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May-November 1991 the main authority of privatization was centralized in the
Department of State Property Conversion under the Ministry of Economic Reforms, see box 3.1.
Then followed a long decentralized period until spring 1994 when the authority was decentralized
to local municipalities for small privatization and to different ministries depending on the type of
enterprises. The privatization process in this period was quite complex and rather slow since many
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ministries wanted to keep their control over the economy. From spring 1994 new legislation
centralized the control to the Latvian Privatization Agency (LPA) and after some lack of clarity
in the first year the privatization process speeded up.
The stages of privatization in Latvia resemble the Estonian pattern: First early privatization
related to the Soviet period and the initial period of independence; then most of the small
privatization took place in the decentralized period conducted mainly by local municipalities, while
only a minor part of large privatization was undertaken in the decentralized stage. The bulk of
large privatization was done by LPA in the last stage. Therefore, like for Estonia, we will
distinguish between early, small and large privatization.
3.2 Early privatization in Latvia
As in Estonia the first opening for take-overs by insiders and new start ups was connected
to the Soviet legislation concerning cooperatives and leasing. New cooperatives counted 246 by
January 1988, 1190 by January 1989, 4086 January 4086 and 4797 July 1990 (Goskomstat). In
July 1990 the cooperatives employed more than 10% of the workforce (Arkadie et al, 1991, p
307). The new cooperatives developed especially in sectors such as construction, trade and
information technology.
The new cooperatives often used the Soviet leasing legislation to transfer assets from state
owned enterprises. On October 1990, the Latvian governme t made a decree to limit this type of
privatization. (Frydman et al, 1993, p. 221). In October 1991 the first Latvian Law on
cooperatives was implemented. All cooperatives had to restructure and re-register before March
1992. The areas open for cooperatives were restricted forcing the dissolution of many coopera-
tives. The permissible areas included insurance association, credit unions, retail trade, agricultural
and fishing production and processing, housing, medical care, information services, sports and
recreational activities (Frydman et al, 1993, p. 210). In this way the cooperative law pointed in the
direction of cooperatives owned by the suppliers and consumers, not employee ownership. Other
types of new cooperatives have probably re-registered under other legal forms.
Leasing of state owned enterprises started in the Soviet period could in most cases continue,
but the legal status remained unclear for a long period. In February 1993 it was made possible for
the group of employees to transfer the accumulated capital under the old leasing system to a new
leasing contract including an option to buy.
The early complex of legislation about different legal forms of ownership included a law on
Joint Stock Companies from 1990. Here it was stated that there could be different classes of
shares and that employee stock could be issued at a discount or free of charge for up to 10% of
the authorized capital. These shares could be issued out of the accumulated reserves. Employee
shares should carry full voting rights and their values should be paid in full upon the employee's
departure from the company (Frydman et. al., 1993, p. 208).
In the Soviet law on state enterprises from 1987 the general meeting of employee was given
some rights concerning future production plans and the right to elect the president of the company.
According to Shteinbuka (1996 p. 182) Latvia was the first republic in the former USSR in which
employees could elect the director of the enterprise. Some of these elements might have had an
influence on the first years of privatization in Latvia. Six experimental privatizations of large
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enterprises were implemented in 1991 and most of the ownership in these firms was transferred
to insiders.
3.3 Small privatization
Except for some early experiments small privatization was started by  November 1991 with
the law on privatization of objects of trade, catering and services. These objects had been
transferred to local municipalities who administered this part of privatization. The initiative for
privatization could come from the employees or other potential buyers. The decision about
privatization, method, initial price etc. were carried out by local privatization commissions with
representatives from: the state, municipality, trade unions and specialists. Possible privatization
methods were: sale to employees, auctions to a selected group, open auctions and sale to a
selected buyer. According to Vojevoda and Rumpis, (1993 p. 8) especially the latest method made
room for dealings of a dubious nature.
Employees who had worked a minimum of 5 years in the enterprise had a preemptive right
to buy at the initial price. Purchasers should be Latvian citizens or have at least 16 years of
residency, so foreigners played no role in the first years of small privatization. The legislation was
changed on February 1992. The preemptive rights for employees were removed, and the scope
of objects widened. Some size restrictions were also removed and the number of branches included
in municipal governed privatization was gradually expanded.
Figure 3.3 - Small privatization in Latvia  (trade, catering and service)
1000 Lats (current p.)1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
enterprises 302 423 231 68 45 45 48 1162
of which sold on
auctions
24
8%
88*
9%*
5
10%
122
11%
initial price 361 1971 3521 1174 2242 1258 865 11392
final price 1350 3871 4044 1188 2245 1263 874 14835
final/initial price 3.74 1.97 1.15 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.30
average final price 4.47 9.15 17.50 17.47 49.89 28.07 18.21 12.77
% paid by vouchers 0% 0% 2% 5% 19% 46% 58% 11%
based on Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. *1992-94.
The chosen method of small privatization was for 1992 only 8% at auctions because the
municipal authorities were against favoring the richest purchasers, and usually auctions resulted
in prices much higher than the initial price. In 1992 the auction price was on average 5 times
higher than the initial price while the average final price were 3.7 times higher than the initial price
(Vojevoda and Rumpis, 1993). Direct sale to employees or to another selected buyer was by far
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the most frequent method and more than half of these small privatization were sold by installments,
see table 3.3-1.
The high price difference between auctions and direct sale shows the favorable conditions
for insiders who could buy at the initial price. These advantages for insiders prevailed in practice
for some time after the legislation had been changed in February 1992. The local privatization
commissions simply continued to give preferences to insiders (Frydman et. al., 1993, p. 223). We
do not have exact data on how big a proportion was taken over by insiders, but we estimate that
especially in the first years this was the case for the majority of small enterprises (see section 7.1).
Most small enterprises had been privatization by 1994, so although the proportion of payment by
vouchers were high in the latest years, vouchers were not important for small privatization.
3.4  Large privatization in Latvia
A list of medium and large enterprises to be privatized was passed with a decree of August
1992 and of February 1993. The list consisted of 579 enterprises proposed by the sector ministries.
400 of these enterprises were planned to be privatized by public offerings of shares, but also 147
were planned to be leased with the option to buy. Later this list was expanded to 712 enterprises
(Jemeljanovs 1996 p. 205). However, except for the leasing option the privatization proceeded
very slowly and before the privatization agency took over only  around 50 large and medium sized
enterprises were privatized and 78 companies transformed into statutory companies as a
preparatory step for privatization.
In 1992-94 when the privatization process was decentralized with a key role to different
ministries the existing networks could be used to the advantage of insiders. This was mainly done
using the legislation on leasing with an option to buy. Former owners had the priority right to
make a leasing contract, but then followed insiders of the company. This gave especially managers
good oportunities to take over their enterprises (Shteinbuka, 1996 p. 187). However, until 1994,
when the possibility of making new leasing contracts was removed with the new privatization law,
privatization was rather slow and this type of privatization only included 234 firms.
In January 1994 started the first stage of privatization of one of the largest enterprises,
Lattelekom. A British-Finnish consortium took over 49% of the shares by guaranteeing an
investment over the following 3 years of 97 mill Lats (160 mill USD).
In 1994 the legislation was changed in the direction of a Treuhandmodel and the Latvian
Privatization Agency (LPA) was established in May 1994. The government gradually transferred
the enterprises to LPA. 907 state property units were transferred in the period 1994-98, mostly
in the first three years. They had a balance of fixed assets for 566 mill LVL and they had 100.000
employees at the date of takeover by LPA. The average enterprise had 110 employees and fixed
assets for a value of 625.000 LVL (1.1 mill USD). Half of the employees were in manufacturing,
most assets were in transport and communication. According to LPA (1997) 75% of the
companies had less than 50 employees, 20% were medium sized with 50-500 employees, and 5%
of the companies were large with more than 500 employees.
LPA made its first interational tender at the end of 1994. In 1995 and 1996 the process
gained some speed although slower than in Estonia. The tender privatization peaked in 1997 with
privatization of 313 enterprises for a total price of 82 mill LVL. The tender process resulted in a
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purchase agreement with a single unit or a consortium most often acquiring a majority of shares.
The exceptions were some of the largest enterprises in which a smaller share was enough to get
a dominating position, see table 3.4-1. Most of these sales were to domestic outsiders, but some
of the largest went to foreign owners. Insiders played a minor role. The list includes some large
infra-structure companies such as Latvian Gaze which was sold to a consortium of German
Ruhrgas and Russian Gazprom. The purchase agreements could involve different combinations
of payment in the form of cash, vouchers, installments and taking over of debt. In addition the
purchasers often guaranteed certain investments and retaining a certain number of employees.
As can be seen from table 3.4-1 more than 1000 enterprises were included in this type of
privatization and the total price of shares were 190 mill LVL (345 mill USD). On average 60%
of the price were financed by vouchers. The market value of vouchers was only around 10-20%
of the nominal value. However, purchasers had to take over a considerable debt in most of the
companies. The total take-over of debt were 244 mill LVL and the investment guarantees were
127 mill LVL over the period. Job-guarantees were given for in total 47 735 jobs or around 50
for the average enterprise.
Insider take-overs lost their importance after 1994. However, mainly in the companies with
shares sold on public offerings the employees had the right to buy up to 20% of the shares. By the
end of 1998 shares of nominal value of 27 mill lats had been sold for vouchers to 25 611
employees and pensioners of the companies comprising 13.56% of the shares (LPA 1998). Shares
for 4.4 mill lats were sold for vouchers to 250 managers of 24 companies, making up 13.6% of
the shares. (LPA 1998).
Some units of enterprises were sold off and some enterprises liquidated and sold in pieces
bringing 1452 liquidation units for sale of 8 mill LVL.
Of the 234 leased enterprises in the earlier stage of privatization 204 have been bought out
in most cases by the leaseholder, 16 leasing contracts have been annulled (LPA, 1998). As can be
seen from table 3.4-1 the average price for leasing buy-outs were on the same level as for tender
privatization.
Sale of state equity holdings represents not completed privatization where a minority, but
often quite dominating share holding, have been sold to a core investor. At the end of 1998 this
type of privatization included 103 large enterprises.
Many of the largest enterprises have combined different privatization methods: Sale of a
dominating block of shares to a core investor, and sale of minority share holdings in public
offerings. The first public offering was held in August 1995, and since then 82 offerings have been
held, selling on average 25% of the shares in the largest enterprises. Some companies had more
rounds of offerings. (From November 1997 and July 1998 the refinery, Ventspils Nafta, had 4
offerings selling 15% of the shares). In total nearly 1 bill Lats nominal value vouchers were
redeemed through public offerings by the end of 1998.
In most cases the price is set in an auction process, but in so called Apeople´s round@ the
price is preset to cut the uncertainty and to attract a broader group of persons. This type of
vouchers was performed for offering 6 mill shares of Ventpils Nafta around Christmas of 1997/98.
Each person with a voucher account could buy 100 shares for 35 LVL nominal voucher value per
share. 18 204 persons got shares, still comprising less than 1 percent of the share capital. In
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January 23 000 bidders got shares in the Riga distillery Latvias Balzams.
Some rounds of public offerings for cash have been performed starting in December 1996.
1 mill shares of Unibanka were sold in a public offering round for cash in July 1997. Later in 1997
followed successful cash offerings of Latvias Krajbanka and a manufacturing company. However,
in the end of the year the cash sale of JSC Grindeks was less successful because of the crisis
started in East Asia and with quite strong effects on the Baltic markets.
Figure 3.4-1 - Large privatization in Latvia - September 1994 - end 1998
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994-98
LPA-purchase contracts*
of which majority foreign capital
14
5
231
26
273
22
313
38
178
34
1009
125
price                           mill LVL
average price            1000 LVL
of which foreign capital**
% foreign/total
1.5
110
1.3
87%
34.3
148
6.5
19%
37.1
136
25.5
69%
82.1
262
20.8
25%
35.1
197
18.6
53%
190.1
188
72.7
38%
of which paid by vouchers     %
paid by vouchers by foreigners
24
0
58
53
72
66
62
41
45
24
60
43
Liabilities assumed     mill LVL
average                     1000 LVL
of which foreign capital**
% foreign/total
0.3
27
13.4
58
0.5
4%
36.5
134
2.3
6%
167.7
536
142.5
85%
27.2
152
244.1
242
Investment guarantees mill LVL
average                     1000 LVL
of which foreign capital**
% foreign/total
1.1
80
0
0
18.3
79
0.8
4%
39.8
145
24.2
61%
39.2
125
37.6
96%
28.5
160
27.5
96%
126.9
125
90.1
71%
Employment guarantees
average
of which foreign capital
297
21
9
2
13.594
59
1.866
72
14.964
55
5730
260
18.880
60
10.100
266
7.607
43
663
20
47.735
47
18.363
147
LPA-liquidation-priv.  units* 3 49 615 652 133 1452
price                           mill LVL 0.2 0.3 2.1 2.6 2.5 7.7
Average                     1000 LVL 73 5 3 4 19 5
Leasing buy outs* 22 95 51 23 13 204
price                           mill LVL 4.6 18.7 5.6 6.3 1.8 37.0
Average price           1000 LVL 209 196 110 273 138 181
Sale of State Equity Holdings 15 16 35 37 103
price                           mill LVL
of which paid by vouchers     %
9.2
44%
9.0
42%
90.2
41%
16.8
47%
125.2
42%
Foreign majority buyer 6 9 10 6 31
Foreign buyer - price   mill LVL
of which paid by vouchers     %
% foreign/total
7.3
38%
80%
8.0
35%
82%
10.0
37%
11%
4.0
18%
24%
29.3
35%
23%
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Public offerings** 21 15 27 19 82
nom. voucher value    mill LVL 57 124 332 441 953
Typical % of shares 20-30% 20-40% 15-25% 5-30% av. 25%
* Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, bulletin 4/1998, ** 1995-97, LPA annual report 1997, 1994 and 1998
own estimates based on LPA-information.
There has been a close connection between the public offering programme and the
development of the Riga stock exchange. The three companies participating in the first round of
public offerings in January 1995 was the first companies traded on the stock exchange in the first
session of July 1995. The public offerings both for vouchers and cash were performed in close
cooperation with the stock exchange. As a result of public offerings 110,659 persons and legal
entities in Latvia have become shareholders.
Figure 3.4-2  privatization vouchers in Latvia - redeemed in LPA-accounts
nominal value       mill. LVL 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total
purchase agreements*
accounts (objects)
5.622
127
26.021
189
21.315
256
41.256
101
25.770
81
120.295
754
public offerings + stat.comp.
accounts
655
33
93.447
104
147.241
115
199.378
201
518.143
137
958.864
590
land
accounts
2.150
45
4.345
218
6.495
263
total
accounts
6277
160
119.468
293
174.832
371
242.780
347
548.259
436
1085.654
1607
market value of vouchers
nominal 28 LVL, end year** 4 1 1 3 2
*incl. lease buy-outs,    Calculations based on LPA, ** Ministry of Economy
In November 1992 a law on vouchers were passed after long political debates, but the
vouchers did not start to be distributed before September 1993 and it did not really take off before
in the summer of 1994. The people got one voucher for each year of living in Latvia after the War.
Prewar citizens and their descendant got on top of this 15 vouchers while 5 vouchers were
deducted from people immigrated after the War. The deduction was payment for "the use of
Latvian infrastructure". People connected to the Soviet Army or KGB did not get any vouchers.
The result was that 87% of the vouchers were eligible for Latvian Citizens (EIU, 2:93). By July
1995, 96,5% of the population had received 104 mill. vouchers with a nominal value of 2.9 billion
Lats.
It is possible to trade the vouchers, but there is a special tax of 2% and a fee to the bank
administering the special privatization account must be paid. Trading of vouchers started by
August 1994. The market price was in the first months less than 10% of the nominal value of 28
Lats. Like in Estonia this reflects partly the lack of clarity about what the vouchers could be used
for. The legislation about voucher-privatization of housing was not passed before July 1995; and
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there was also much uncertainty about the privatization of enterprises for vouchers for a long
period. Another reason behind the low voucher price is the lack of information and high need of
means for consumption in the poorest part of the population. Like in Estonia a concentration of
wealth took place in the first three months of voucher trading when the vouchers were traded for
around 1-3 Lats. Then as expected the price rose to a level of 4-6 Lats, but then surprisingly the
price fell from February 1995 and in the second half of 1995 the price was only 1 Lat per voucher
(Shteinbuka 1996). This was an indication of the general uncertainty in Latvia and were also
related to the banking crisis.  In the end of 1997 the price peaked at 3 Lats, and then it fell to 2
Lats in the end of 1998.
Only very few investment funds was formed. Since 1995 9 licences were given for
investment funds based on vouchers, but only 5 were functioning. In 1995-98 vouchers for a
nominal value of only around 9 mill Lats were put into investment funds making up less than 1%
of the distributed vouchers (Ministry of Economy).
A large number of commercial banks of Latvia was started as semi-private entities owned
by state owned companies. Their full privatization had to follow the privatization of their owners.
Of the 10 largest banks 34% of the capital was owned by state owned enterprises in June 1994.
Often the banks functioned as agents for their owners to organize the short time finance of trade
flows (World Bank, 1993). In the first years the Bank of Latvia covered the major part of the
commercial banking through special commercial branches. In December 1992 the commercial
branches were transferred to the Bank Privatization Committee. In late 1993 21 of these
commercial branches were merged in the new "Unibank". Non-performing loans were replaced
by long-term governme t bonds in April 1994 and the privatization program started in 1995. In
May-June 21% of the shares were sold for vouchers in public offerings. International sale of shares
(or depository receipts) of Unibanka were made in 1997. Other bank privatization include Latvian
Investment Bank privatized 1997-98, Trasta Komercbanka in 1997, and Krajbanka, that had to
be restructured first and privatization were postponed to 1999.
Foreign capital has played an increasing role in Latvian privatization. In early privatizations
and the first part of the small privatizations the share of foreign capital was negligible, but in the
large privatization performed by LPA  there were quite many take-overs by foreign investors. For
the LPA purchase contracts, 1994-1998, (see table 4.3-1) foreign capital made up 38% of the total
price, 67% of the debt taken over (1995-1997) and 71% of the investment guarantees. Foreigners
took over around a quarter of the purchase contract for equity share holdings. The foreign
involvement is concentrated in quite few of the largest enterprises in manufacturing, energy,
transport, telecommunications and the financial sector.
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4.  The privatization process in Lithuania
4.1  Stages of privatization - organization and legislation
The privatization process in Lithuania has been very different from the development in
Estonia and Latvia. In the first years of transition, privatization was much faster and more
comprehensive. In fact, the first part of privatization 1991-95 in Lithuania was one of the fastest
in Eastern Europe. Vouchers and employee-ownership had a more important role, and direct sale
and foreign investment had only a negligible role in this stage. The policy put much more emphasis
on the interests of the workers. The main explanation behind this development lies in the fact that
non-titular Lithuanian groups played a limited role. Nearly the whole population was united in the
fight for independence. Once this fight was won, the nationalist parties had a much weaker
position than it was the case in Estonia and Latvia, and economic problems and questions
concerning distribution were in the focus of the political debate. The workers were politically
stronger, because they were not split in a Lithuani n and a Russian-speaking group. The
independent Lithuanian communist party had a quite strong position in the parliament of 1990 to
1992, and the victory of its successor, the Democratic Labor Party, at the election in 1992 shows
the strength of left wing political forces.
The economic reforms were planned well a head of the full independence after August 1991.
In fact, already in the spring of 1990 Lithuania was acting as an economic independent unit - and
was blocked by USSR. This means that the period of early privatization was very short in
Lithuania. The main privatization - the LIPSP program started up already in September 1991. The
process was monitored by the Department of Privatization in the Ministry of Economy, a central
privatization commission approved the overall plans, local commissions approved many of the
detailed plans, and most sales were conducted by local privatization offices. Vouchers played an
important role and the privatization was made quite fast without major changes in the framework,
but with some adjustment in e.g. employee shares.
The LIPSP-program was from the start planned to finish already after one year, but the
program was extended to September 1994 and then again to June 1995, when it was finished after
having fulfilled most of the planned objectives, see below.
After the end of the LIPSP-program followed a period with lack of clarity and some political
turmoil. The second stage did not officially start before one year later. In this stage, leftovers from
LIPSP and some of the very large companies including public utilities and infrastructure
enterprises were planned to be sold. The Lithuanian Privatization Agency (LPA) was established
to administrate and implement this privatization for cash, but except for this the organization was
not radically changed. The founding ministries still had an important role to prepare the objects
for privatization. However, now they had more scope in relation to the time and methods for
privatization and the result was almost a stand-still in the privatization process.
This was the background for the change in organization in the end of 1997 by establishing
the State Property Fund. SPF replaced LPA and at the same time SPF took over the role of the
founding enterprises. In this way, SPF to a high degree got the same authority as the sister
organizations in Estonia and Latvia. However, the responsibility for the implementation of some
of the largest privatizations oriented towards international investors were given to the Ministry of
European Affairs.
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Box 3: Lithuania - stages of privatization - organization and legislation
Organization:
First stage: February 1991-June 1995 - LIPSP-program
Department of Privatization, Ministry of Economy - monitored
Central Privatization Commission - approved privatization plans
local municipalities and founding ministries - prepared entities for privatization
Second stage: July 1995 - December 1997 - decentral privatization for cash
Founding ministries - prepare enterprises for privatization, chose methods etc.
Lithuanian Privatization Agency - implements 
Parliamentary Privatization Commission - approves
Third stage: from January 1998 - centralized privatization for cash
Centralization of  the functions as founder and administrator in the State Property Fund (SPF),
Parliamentary Privatization Commission - final approval
Strategic objects for international tender carried out by sector specific Public Tender Commissions
and Ministry of European Affairs
Legislation:
April 1990 - Law on accumulation of Employee shares up to 10% of the capital
October 1990 - Insiders in leased companies can convert leasing-fees to shares
February 1991 - Law on the Initial Privatization of State Property (LIPSP)
October 1991 - Government decree legalizing investment funds
April 1992 - LIPSP amendment - employees priority to buy 30% of shares
September 1992 - Accumulated profits can be used for shareholder shares
January 1993 - LIPSP amendment - employees priority to buy 50% of shares
June 1995 - LIPSP officially ended, remaining vouchers usable for a few items
July 1995 - Law on the Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Property
July 1995 - Law on Investment Companies (strengthening regulation)
February 1997 - announcing case by case privatization of 14 large companies
July 1997 - Law on investment companies (strengthening regulation)
November 1997 - new Law on the Privatization - SPF
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.2 Early privatization in Lithuania
The new cooperatives were not so widespread in Lithuania as in the other Baltic Countries.
In 1990 they made up around 4500 enterprises with about 5% of the total workforce. Because
they were not included in the official legal forms in the enterprise law from 1990, they were
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transformed into other legal forms of partnerships and closed Joint Stock Companies (Mygind,
1995 p 264).
The first privatizations were in the form of transfers of shares of leased enterprises to
employees according to a resolution of October 1990. The amount transferred was the sum of the
leasing fees paid, plus delayed wage payment invested in production plus part of social funds.
Almost 60 enterprises were included in this program. Another early transfer to employees was
included in a law from December 1990. Enterprises with capital exceeding a certain amount could
sell up to 10% of their capital to employees. Part of this could be paid by vouchers. 50-60% of
state enterprises used this method in the start of priva-tization until July 1991, when another
program started (Frydman et. al. 1993).
4.3 First stage privatization - the LIPSP-program
The cornerstone in the fast privatization in Lithuania was the voucher scheme. The Law on
the Initial Privatization of State-owned Property (LIPSP) was passed in February 1991 at a time
when the result of the fight for independence was far from clear. The privatization plan was one
of the elements in the fight for independence i  Lithuania. The scheme signaled determination in
the struggle for economic self-management. It included privatization of enterprises formally owned
and controlled by the central authorities in Moscow. The vouchers and the cash quotas, described
below, were given only to residents. This made an effective barrier for a flow of rubles from the
rest of (former) Soviet Union to join the privatization process.
The voucher scheme was probably inspired by the Czech discussion and plans, but the
Lithuanians were the first to implement the system. The vouchers were distributed in April 1991,
the sale of enterprises started in September 1991 and investment funds were approved in
December 1991 at the time when the Czech-voucher system took off. The distribution of vouchers
was dependent on the age of the citizens. People 35 years or older received a face value of 5000
Rubles. People younger than 18 years received 1000 Rubles, and between these groups the amount
was stepped down from 5000 to 1000 Rubles. The voucher rights and all the transactions were
recorded in special accounts in the public Savings Bank. The nominal amount was revalued several
times increasing the nominal value of the vouchers to compensate for inflation and the revaluation
of the assets to be privatized. The account system was made to control the limited allowed
transferability of vouchers. It was only allowed to transfer vouchers to relatives, but later it was
also possible to use voucher in exchange for outstanding loans i  housing, and there was made a
loophole in relation to investment funds. In reality there were some official trading of vouchers.
Up to the end of 1997 the State Property fund has registered a turnover of 421 mill Lats of
vouchers, or around 4% of the distributed vouchers. The price was even higher than the nominal
value in the start of the process in 1992. This fact reflects the policy of limited use of cash. The
turnover peaked in 1993 with around 200 mill Litas. Later the market price of vouchers fell in
relation to the indexed nominal value. In the second half of 1994 it was only 7-8% of the nominal
value indicating the uncertainty about whether the remaining vouchers could be used for buying
assets after the termination of LIPSP. When it was clear that the unused vouchers still had some
limited use the price stabilized around 10-13% in 1995-97 (based on information from SPF). 
Many investment funds were established on private initiative in the autumn of 1991, and the
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law was amended in December 1991 to legalize their functions. People could invest their vouchers
in the funds. In return, they got shares in the funds. The funds invested the vouchers in different
firms. Investment-fund-shares could be sold for cash. The funds were most active in 1992-93. In
March 1994, about 33% of the privatized capital was owned by Investment Funds According to
Lee (1996) around 400 funds were established in relation to the LIPSP privatization. Around 300
funds were formed to purchase single enterprises, insiders pooling their shares to acquire control
with the company, 60-70 funds having diversified ownership and the remaining 30-40 having
sizable capital and up to 25000 shareholders. According to Semeta (1996) 308 investment funds
participated actively in the privatization of 1092 enterprises and acquired assets worth of 1586 mill
Litas - book value 737 mill Litas or 21% of the total book value of privatized assets.
A law on investment companies was passed on July 1995, strengthening the regulation on
auditing, reserves etc. and requiring the funds to get a license either as a mutual fund or a holding
company. The deadline was July 1, 1997 and most of the investment funds did not fulfil the
requirement. By the end of 1998 there were only 22 investment companies left with a total of 228
mill Litas worth of shares (Latvian Statistical Department, 1999). It is not clear to what extent
 equity has been channeled back to the original voucher owners, or to what extent the investment
funds has been used for Atunneling@ assets to enterprises owned by the people controlling the
investment funds.
Figure 4.3-1 The use of vouchers in the LIPSP-privatization - by July 1995
public subscription of shares 5833 mill Litas 55.3%
Tenders 415 mill Litas 4.0%
auctions - small privatization 165 mill Litas 1.6%
sale residual state shares (2nd round) 392 mill Litas 3.7%
enterprise privatization     Total 6805 mill Litas 64.6 %
for privatization of flats 2042 mill Litas 19.4%
for agricultural entities 410 mill Litas 4.0%
for land 521 mill Litas 5.0%
not used 726 mill Litas 7.0%
Total 10504 mill Litas 100.0%
Dept. of privatization, Ministry of Economics
The vouchers could be used both in the auctions for small enterprises, in share subscriptions
for large enterprises, and in privatization of housing. The assets were sold for a combination of
cash and vouchers. The cash quota connected to the vouchers set a limit for how much cash a
person could use to bid on the assets to be privatized. The cash limits were softened, when existing
tenants bid on their apartment, or when enterprises were not sold in the first auction. On February
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1994, about 30% of the vouchers were still not used, and it was discussed what to do with the
remaining vouchers. In the law, it was stipulated that the vouchers not used for buying assets
would be converted to state bonds at the end of the planned privatization period. However, such
a solution would be very expensive for the state budget. Instead, it was decided to move the
deadline to July 1995 and prepare the remaining firms for privatization. After the deadline, still
around 7% of the vouchers were not used. They were not terminated, but had still some limited
use in acquiring plots of land and housing.
Under LIPSP employees had the opportunity to buy a certain percentage of the shares in the
first round at concessional rates before most of the remaining shares were sold in public offerings
in later rounds. This percentage of shares available for employees was increased from 10% in
1991, to 30% in 1992 and to 50% after the labor party took over the government in early 1993.
Employees could use vouchers as well as cash to buy shares. The price paid in the first round was
usually below the market price. Moreover, because of only partial indexation of the price of the
assets and the value of the vouchers, the advantage of employees increased over time
(Martinavicius, 1996). This system made it possible for  employees to obtain  a considerable part
of the ownership even in large enterprises with relatively high capital-intensity. The 20% extra
shares reserved for employees after 1993 initially did not have voting rights, but later it was made
possible for the general meeting of the enterprise to convert these shares into normal voting shares.
Contrary to the case in the other Baltic countries, the advantages for employees in small
privatization was usually smaller than in large privatization because small enterprises were  mostly
sold in public auctions.
Programs for sale of state owned enterprises to foreigners were introduced already in 1992,
but until 1995 this program was used only in a limited number of cases. Also, little use was made
of  restitution of  industrial enterprises to former owners.  Hence,  employee ownership was an
important element in the privatization process, especially in large enterprises. The LIPSP program
did not formally include special preferences for employees in small privatization, but because of
inside information and access to resources for purchase in the form of vouchers,  insiders also had
a relatively strong position in the privatization of small firms. It should be noticed that although
small privatization included around half of the 6000 enterprises to be privatized in the LIPSP
program, the small enterpris s only covered a small percentage of the total assets and the total
number of employees, see table 4.3-2.
Data from the Privatization Department in the Ministry of Economics clearly show the
spread of employee ownership over time in Lithuania. Soon after the start of privatization, at the
end of 1992, employees had got a relatively small part of total privatized equity and 67% of
enterprises had no employee ownership. This figure does not include the earliest insider-takeovers
of shares which were formally outside the LIPSP-program. In just two years there was an
astonishing change. By 1994 fewer than 5% of the privatized firms in the LIPSP program had no
employee ownership and the percentage of enterprises where the majority of privatized assets
were taken over by employees increased from 3% in 1991-1992, to 65% in 1993, and to 92% in
1994-1995. These developments reflect the massive increase in support for employee take-overs.
However, in most of the enterprises the state kept some equity.
Small privatization of enterprises with a book value below a certain amount was done by
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auction, where vouchers and cash quotas could be used. There were special conditions to secure
the continuation of the current activity for at least three years, and lay-offs of employee were
restricted to max 30% in the same period. By August 1992 1300 small enterprises were privatized
by October 1994 the number was 2498, and in July 1995 it was 2727 (Ministry of Economics).
In the normal procedure for privatization the enterprise initially made a privatization pl n
that should be approved by the Central Privatization Commission often represented by
Privatization Committees of regional governments. In most cases, 89% of the shares were for sale.
The initial offer for the first round was based on the book value revalued by some inflation
parameter. If the bids did not hit the price within an interval of 10%, the price was regulated up
or down, and a new round of bids took place.
Figure 4.3-2 Employee-owned share of privatized capital - LIPSP  mill Litas
% owned by insiders 0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-100% total
Sept. 1 1991
April 7 1992
firms
capital
510
338
100
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
510
338
100
100
April 7 1992
Febr. 1 1993
firms
capital
410
433
43
46
47
96
5
10
172
191
18
20
240
162
25
17
76
60
8
6
945
942
100
100
Febr. 1 1993
July. 1 1995
firms
capital
29
13
2
1
39
83
3
6
66
174
5
13
141
230
10
17
1190
851
81
63
1465
1351
100
100
Sept. 1 1991
July 1. 1995
firms
capital
c./firm
949
785
1.21
33
30
86
179
2.08
3
7
238
365
1.53
8
14
381
391
1.03
13
15
1266
912
0.72
43
35
2920
2632
0.90
100
100
Based on data from Dept. of Privatization, Ministry of Economy, Oct. 1995
The table is based on the privatized capital, more than 50% might not imply majority employee ownership because the
state have retained a proportion of the shares. In the other direction counts the fact, that only registered employee owned
capital in the LIPSP program is included. This do not include certain stocks which also could be controlled by insiders
e.g. through investment funds, or stocks bought before LIPSP or after the first offering.
It was most difficult to sell the large energy intensive enterprises in heavy industry with close
relations to the former Soviet Union. There were attempts to break them up into smaller units, and
part of them was put on sale for foreign currency. In August 1992, a list of 114 state owned
enterprises/objects for unrestricted sale for foreign currency were published. By July 1995 the list
had been reduced to 71 enterprises. Out of these 48 were sold for 28 mill Litas of which only 4
were sold to foreign investors. This type of privatization was relatively slow and foreign sales were
negligible. In fact, since the Litas were convertible in the latest years it would be more correct to
call this part "privatization for cash". It is interesting to note that it was not mainly the Labor
Party, but the conservative opposition who resisted sale to foreigners. This especially concerned
enterprises considered to be of strategic importance. The opposition feared Russian take-overs.
Therefore, they resisted strongly liberalization of foreigners´ right to buy land. The opposition was
for some years able to bloc changes because liberalization in this field needed a constitutional two-
thirds majority. However, the legislation was a barrier for further integration into EU, and in the
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end of 1995 a parliamentary committee agreed about giving rights to buy land for foreigners
coming from states that were OECD members in 1989 (Baltic Independent, Dec 15, 1995).
By July 1995 the Ministry of Economics estimated the total number of state enterprises
before privatization to 8177 with a total book value of 13547 mill Litas, (measured in 1995 Litas).
Of these had 6698 enterprises with a total bookvalue of 9853 mill Litas been presented for
privatization. 5740 were included into the privatization program, and many of these were not
planned to be 100% privatized. Planned for privatization were only bookvalue of 4849 mill Litas.
Included in LIPSP with sale mainly for vouchers were 2936 large enterprises with 6145 mill Litas
of total capital and 2727 small enterprises with 79 mill Litas of capital. Parts of 15 (12) large
enterprises with capital of 499 (360) mill Litas were put on special tender mainly for vouchers.
Figure 4.3-2  - Overview over LIPSP-small and large privatization
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 total  plan %
firms  privatized 846 2224 1257 821 551 5700 5740 99%
accumul. % of plan 38% 62% 75% 99%
public subscription 2926 2936 99%
small, auctions
assumul. % of plan 57% 70% 76% 100%
2726 2727 100%
Tender 15 15
hard currency 48 71
book value  mill Litas Vouche
r value
public subscription 2632 5833
Small 79 79 165
Tender 499 499 415
hard currency 28 -
priv. before LIPSP 545 -
residual sold 252 392
121 1047 1240 1071 548 4035 4849 85%
Dept. of privatization, Ministry of Economics
Out of the enterprises for sale there were already in the end of 1992 sold 57% of the small
and 38% of the large enterprises. By 1993 the numbers had increased to 70% and 62%, and by
1994 the numbers were 76% for small and 75% for large enterprises. This testifies a very fast
privatization process. According to the Ministry of Economics by the end of LIPSP all 2727 small
enterprises and 2926 or 99% of the large enterprises included into LIPSP had been privatized. By
the end of the LIPSP-period July 1, 1995  83% of the capital to be privatized had been privatized.
This covered nearly 100% in construction and services, 91% in industry, but only 31% in transport
and public utilities. Out of the total amount of vouchers 7% had been unused, 64% had been used
for payment of shares in enterprises, 19% for privatization of apartments and 9% for land and
agricultural entities (Ministry of Economics).
In this stage of privatization Lithuania had the lowest level of foreign investments in the
Baltics both in absolute and especially in relative terms. Foreign investment in Lithuania
accumulated at the end of 1995 was 228 mill USD distributed on 5018 units. Of these were 70%
27
joint ventures and 30% wholly owned. The largest investor countries were UK, Germany and
USA. Russia accounted for only 4% of FDI (World Bank 1996).
4.4 Second and third stage of privatization in Lithuania - 1995-1998
After the termination of the voucher privatization Lithuania established in the end of 1995
a Privatization Agency which should implement the privatization of the remaining assets for
privatization. That was mainly: residual shares, public utilities and infrastructure companies. The
process was based on a new law from July 1995 on Privatization of State and Municipal Property.
The law delegated significant powers to the so-called founders of enterprises, in most cases line-
ministries or local municipalities. They should prepare a list of companies to be privatized,
sometimes after certain restructuring and they should propose the privatization methods, which
could be auction (small enterprises), public subscription of shares (small and medium), tender
(medium and large), lease with option to buy and direct negotiations. No vouchers were involved
in this new stage of Aprivatization for cash@.
In 1996 a new list of 454 objects with 835 mill Litas of state capital to be privatized was
approved by the government. Later the list was extended to include 1114 entities with state capital
of 1.5 bln Litas. The value of state owned shares varied from a few percent to 100 percent. In
1996, only 47 small blocks of residual shares were privatized for a total price of 3.2 mill Litas. The
process accelerated in 1997 to include 272 entities for 82 mill Litas. In 1996 and 1997 nearly all
privatizations were done by public auction, table 4.4.
In February 1997, the new Lithuanian government announced the privatization of 14 major
state enterprises in communication, energy, airlines, shipbuilding with a total of 2.3 bln Litas of
state capital and 10791 employees. The Ministry of European Affairs should manage this part of
the privatization.
On December 1997 a new law on privatization came into effect starting the third stage of
privatization in Lithuania. The authority was centralized in the Lithuanian Property Fund (LPF),
which both took the function as founder and as administrator of privatization. The Property Fund
way has similar functions and authorities as the privatization agencies in Estonia and Latvia.
Figure 4.4   Second and Third stage privatization in Lithuania
1996 1997 1998 Total
no of objects privatized 47 272 344 663
Privatized cap. (bookvalue) mill Litas 4.8 54.7 846.7 906.2
initial price                          mill Litas 3.0 56.8 2323.0 2382.8
Selling price                         mill Litas 3.2 82.4 2328.8 2414.4
Methods of privatization
Public auction                          objects
                                            Mill
Litas
46
3.2
264
80.8
321
72.1
631
156.1
Public tender                           objects 0 1 14 15
28
                                            Mill
Litas
0 0.9 214.9 215.8
direct negotiations                   objects
                                            mill Litas
0
0
0
0
1
2040.0
1
2040.0
Leasing with option to buy      objects
                                            Mill
Litas
1
0
7
0.7
2
0.1
10
0.8
Public subscription                  objects
                                            Mill
Litas
0
0
0
0
6
1.7
6
1.7
based on information from SPF
The sale of state-owned property accelerated in 1998. The biggest deal was made for
Lithuanian Telecom with 60% of the shares sold to the Telia-Sonera consortium. The
Swedish/Finnish group paid 2.04 bln Litas (510 mill USD) and guaranteed investments for 884 mill
Litas. This privatization makes up 88% of the total selling price for the period 1996-1998 so in
this way foreign investors clearly dominate the privatization in the second and third stage. Also
some of the other large privatization were sold to foreign owners including two shipyards,  some
sugar factories, and the largest hotel in Vilnius sold to Danish and Norwegian investors (revenue
around 50 mill USD). The privatization method for minority holdings continued to be public
auctions, but the remaining larger enterprises were sold by tenders or direct negotiations as was
the case with Lithuanian Telecom, see table 4.4.
By the end of 1998 the government had approved a list of over 2000 entities with state
capital to be privatized. However, only around 200 of these enterprises were majority controlled
by the state.
The commercial activities of The Bank of Lithuania were transferred to the State
Commercial Bank in September 1992. As in the other Baltic countries in a number of private
commercial banks grew up. A banking crisis 1995/96 was followed by a strengthening of
regulation and a fall in the number of banks. There were still three large state-owned banks
including the Agricultural bank and the Savings Bank which was the main deposit bank for
individuals. The state tried to privatize the Agricultural-bank in 1998. The State Commercial bank
was merged with the Savings Bank and planned to be privatized in 1999. By 1998 there were 10
banks of which 2 state owned and 4 foreign owned.
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5.  Overview over privatization and institutions for corporate governance
In this section we will summarize and compare the development of privatization in the three
Baltic countries and look at the institutional framework of corporate governance such as
bankruptcy legislation, the role of the financial sector and the capital market. The results of
privatization in the Baltic countries are summarized in figure 5-1.
There have been important differences in the political development in the three countries
which have meant that they have chosen different paths of changing the ownership structure from
a planned system to a market system based on private ownership (see Mygind 1994, 1995, 1996).
 In Estonia and Latvia, the nationalist-oriented policies in relation to the large Russian speaking
minority meant that the period supporting broad employee take-overs of enter-prices was very
short. Before independence employee take-overs implied that control was taken away from central
authorities in Moscow to the Baltic Republics. When this goal was accomplished the next goal was
to strengthen the position of the titular population and to find the most efficient ownership
structure. In Lithuania with only a negligible Russian speaking minority, the workers and
employees in general had a much stronger political role. Therefore, the early ideas of insider-take-
overs were further developed in the early years of transition with the implementation of the LIPSP
program. At the same time, there was strong resistance against selling out Lithuania to foreign
investors and Lithuanians feared Russian take-overs in the form of Russian FDI into Lithuania.
Thus, the Lithuanian policies for a long period was quite restrictive toward FDI in sharp contrast
to Estonia implementing very liberal rules for foreign capital opening up for inflow of especially
Finnish and Swedish investors.
In all three countries there was in the second half of the 1980´s the first movements in the
direction of private enterprises in the form of new cooperatives, individual firms and in the end of
the period leasing and joint ventures. This development was strongest in Estonia functioning to
a high degree as a lab for market reforms in USSR. The Asmall state enterprises@ with semi-private
spinn offs from state owned enterprises is part of this development. Also in Latvia a fast
development of new-cooperatives made an early start of private entrepreneurship.
In 1989 both in Estonia and Lithuania new economic reform programs were defined and
started to be implemented and in both countries plans for privatization were developed. In Estonia
the idea of employee-controlled Apeople enterprises@ was only implemented in a limited number
of cases because of the change in policies related to the dissolvement of USSR. The insider bias
in legislation continued until spring 1992 in small privatization, but the bulk of privatization was
without preferences for insiders. In Latvia most advantages for insiders in small privatization were
also taken away in 1992 although there were more scope for continuation of some insider
advantages in the following years.
In Lithuania the comprehensive LIPSP program implemented already in September 1991
meant that insiders got a strong role in the privatization of not only the small, but also most of the
medium and larger enterprises. The LIPSP program was to a high degree based on vouchers. The
largest enterprises including most utilities were only to a limited extent included in the LIPSP
privatization.
All three countries have had large voucher schemes involving most of the residents.
However, in both Estonia and Latvia the bulk of vouchers were related to the privatization of land
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and housing. In Lithuania 65% of the vouchers were used in enterprise privatization, in Estonia
28% and in Latvia 42%. In Estonia and Latvia most of these vouchers went to broad public
Figure 5-1  Overview over privatization of enterprises, 1989-98
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
early Small SOEs and new coops,
mostly owned by  management.
Soviet leasing, 12 empl.owned
Estonian leasing 200, insider
mainly management owned
new cooperatives
mostly owned by management
Soviet leasing to employees
new cooperatives
os ly owned by management
Soviet leasing, 60 empl. Owned,
1990-91, Employee-shares,
2-3% of assets
Smal
l
Dec 1990 law: insider advantag-
es 80% of 450 employee owned,
advantages limited May 1992
and cut away June 1993
most privatized by end of 1992
Legislation November 1991
partly by local municipalities,
below 10 employees, auction
bidders >16 years residency
trade, catering, service
85% privatized 1994
mainly by management
some to other employees.
LIPSP vouchers and cash quotas
can be used in auctions,
c ditions: employment canot
be reduced more than 30%
and same activity 3 years.
      1992  1993  1994  1995
sold  57%  70%  76%  100%
no advantages for employees
large 1989: 7 peoples enterpris s
1991: 7 SOE experiments
most employee owned
-------------------------------------
1992: EPA Treuhandmodel.
advantage: outsiders,foreigners
tenders based on price, and 
investment- and job-guarantees
by the end of 1998:
483 enterprises for
4.7 bill EEK (400 mill USD)
4.6 bill EEK invest. guarantees
56000 job guarantees
peak of privatization 1994
most privatized 1995
nearly all by end of 1998
by 1998 15.4 bln EEK vouchers
distributed
Public offering of minority
shares for vouchers started au-
tumn 1994, by the end of 97: 39
holdings for 2.3 bln EEK
(most vouchers for housing)
end 1998 only few utilities left
1991, 6 SOE sold to insiders 
1992-94 decentral privatizat.
by sector ministries
ca. 50 firms privatized
78 corporatized
234 leased, mainly to insiders
-----------------------------------
May 1994 centralized at LPA
by the end of 1998:
1009 tender privatizations for
190 mill LVL (350 millUSD)
244 mill LVL debt taken over
127 mill LVLinvestguarantee
47735 job guarantees
peak of privatization 1997
most privatized 1997
nearly all by the end of 1998
by Jan. 1996 3 bln LVL vou-
chers distributed to 2,4 mill
97% of the population
Aug. 1994 voucher market
1995-98  82 public offerings 
1 bln LVL vouchers
(most vouchers for housing)
end 1998 only few utilities and
arge enterprises left
Sept. 1991, LIPSP privatization -
s le of shares through
vouchers and cash quotas,
Dec. 1991, Investment Funds,
the share employees can buy at
preferential terms increased
1991:10%,1992:30%,1993:50%
         1992   1993   1994   1995
sold  38%   62%    75%    99%
o  LIPSP 2926 enterprises,
tenders of min. shares utilities,
46 SOE Ahard currency sale@,
peak of privatization 1992
most medium and large firms
privatized by end of 1994
remaining shares and very large
quite slow process
--------------------------------------
1996 Lit. Privatization Agency
privatization for cash founding
ministries and  municipalities
slow down process
1998 Centralization of process
in State Property Fund,
remaining privatizations faster
including some of largest firms
end 1998 some utilities and
large enterprises left.
offerings of minority holdings after sale of the majority to a core investor, but also in both these
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countries a core investor could finance a big share of the down payment by vouchers in the tender
privatizations, figure 5-2.
Figure 5-2 - The use of vouchers for privatization in the Baltics
Nominal value mill local currency Estonia Latvia Lithuania
mainly core owners,tender/LIPSP* 2030   (13) 165   (5) 6805  (65)
public offering - minority holdings 2310 (15) ****1120 (37) 0    (0)
housing - land - agriculture 7090 (46) 596 (20) 2973  (28)
not used        (end year) 1998  3970**(26) 1998   878 (38)1995   726   (7)
total distributed 15400 (100) 3032 (100) 10504 (100)
USD per capita *** 755 2028 706
*incl. small privatization (less than 10% of the amount), **incl. compensation fund. ***1994 exchange rates
****Ministry of Economy includes also cases when majority of shares have been sold, but not to a core investor.
In Lithuania, vouchers could only be used in the LIPSP-program. Often majority share
holdings were bought mainly for vouchers. Although the LIPSP privatization resulted in a more
diversified ownership structure, than the tender privatizations in Estonia and Latvia, we estimate
that in most cases a core group of owners, most often insiders, acquired a majority of shares.
Therefore, this type of privatization are categorized together with tenders on figure 5-3. In the
later stages of privatization minority share holdings were sold for cash. In this way Lithuania had
a complete opposite way of using vouchers for majority/minority shares compared to the two
other Baltic countries.
Because of the limited role of vouchers in enterprise privatization in Estonia and Latvia
investment funds played only a limited role in these countries. In Lithuania around 3-400
investment funds were started in relation to the LIPSP-program. Most of them were used as
leverage for a group of insiders to take control with their companies, but a few developed to
investment funds representing a high number of investors and with a diversified portfolio in a large
number of companies. However, when the regulation was tightened in 1997 most of the
investment funds were dissolved.
The timing of privatization was quite similar for the small privatization, but quite different
between the three countries for the large privatization. In all three countries, the majority of small
enterprises were privatized already in the early years of transition 1992-93. However, for the
medium and large enterprises there have been marked differences. With the implementation of the
LIPSP-program, Lithuania had the peak of privatization already in 1993 and most larger
enterprises were privatized by the end of 1994. Note, however, that in most companies some
shares remained state owned, and especially in some very large companies only around 10% of the
shares were privatized, so in total only around 50% of the capital were privatized in the involved
companies. In Estonia the privatization through EPA had the highest momentum by 1994 and most
larger enterprises were privatized by the end of 1995. In Latvia the privatization through LPA
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gained momentum in 1995-96 to peak in 1997, and large privatization was nearly accomplished
by the end of 1998.
Figure 5-3 - Different types of privatization of large enterprises end 1998
mill local
currency
leasing
mainly
insiders
mainly
insider
buy-outs
tender
core-
investor
of which
minority
publ.offer
restitution
liquidated
/other
still
state
owned**
total
Estonia
firms
%
100*
16
7
1
483
75
39
(overlap)
40*
6
10*
1
640*
100
price ?
-
?
-
6875
67
2300
22
100*
1
?
9*
10300*
100
Latvia
firms 237
18
6
0
1009
75
82
(overlap)
? 100*
7
1350*
100
price 37
-
?
-
434
27
  953
60
? ?
13*
1600*
100
Lithuania
firms
%
60
2
2940
89
100*
3
300
(overlap)
? 200*
6
3300*
100
price ?
-
4000*
42
2500*
26
100*
1
? ?
30*
9600*
100
Price = price for the share privatized incl. nominal value of vouchers, (For Estonia incl. debt taken over). Vouchers
counted as nominal value (if market value price for e.g. public offerings in Latvia would be only 10% of the nominal
value). * Estimate.    ** Firms, majority state owned, value, including minority state shares.
 
Looking at the largest enterprises in utilities and infrastructure Estonia has been the fastest
followed by Latvia. Here Lithuania has been relatively slow. This has also been the case for the
sale of residual state share holdings in companies already included in the LIPSP privatization. So
while being fastest in the first round Lithuania is slowest in the last round of privatization, but after
2-3 years of hesitation and slow action from the end of LIPSP in June 1995 the privatization
gained momentum in 1998.
In all three countries, foreign investors played only a minor role in the privatization of small
enterprises. The advantages for insiders crowded out the possibilities for outsiders especially
foreign investors. After 1992, they had some possibilities in Estonia. That was to some extent also
the case in Latvia. However, for Lithuania the foreigners had a very weak position in the LIPSP-
privatization.
Estonia was the first country to use privatization for the promotion of foreign investment
in relation to large privatization. In the tender process foreign capital had a strong position because
of their access to capital, management skills, and international business networks. Already from
1993 foreigners took over some of the largest enterprises under privatization. By the end of 1998
foreigners had taken over approximately one third of enterprise assets included in large
privatization - in the years 1996-98 the foreigners paid 56% of the price paid for privatization.
 Latvia started the same process in the autumn of 1994 and the foreign share of purchase was 38%
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for the years 1994-1998. In Lithuania the LIPSP-privatization gave very little room for foreigners,
and only 4 enterprises out of 46 were taken over by foreign investors in the privatization for hard
currency up to 1995. After LIPSP followed the period of stagnation and not before 1998 did
foreign capital start to play an important role in privatization in Lithuania. However, just the single
foreign investment in Lithuanian Telecom of more than 2 bln Litas imply that privatization revenue
makes up a very big part of total FDI-stock in Lithuania, see figure 5-4.
Figure 5-4  The role of foreign investors in large privatization in the Baltics
mill local currency units Estonia    Latvia     Lithuania   
FDI accumulated end 1998*
per capita     Local/USD
20623  (100)
13568 /1130$  
 
846  (100)
344/615 $        
6501 (100)
1757/437 $      
 
purchase of privatized firms
% total privatization revenue
1439   (7.0)
31%         
111** (13) 2250  (35)
debt taken over
% of total large privatization
495   (2.4)
 23%          
150?  (18)
investment guarantees
% of total large privatization
2364 (11.5)
51%          
184  (22) 900?  (14)
* Estonia 1993-1998, Latvia and Lithuania, stock of FDI end of 1998, Lithuania dominated by foreign investment in
Telecom (purchase price 2040 mill Litas, investment guarantees 884 mill Litas). Latvia investment guarantees includes
Lattelekom with 97 mill Lats. ** based on LPA-report 1998.
The methods of privatization have had a great impact on the ownership structure in the
Baltic countries. However, privatization can only be considered to be the initial stage of
developing the ownership and corporate governance system. Especially in the cases where special
groups have been given specific advantages to acquire the assets, it can be expected that they have
not got the preferred portfolio-combination through the privatization process. Many new owners
will be interested in selling their shares and some other groups might want to take-over. Quite
intense trading in the period after privatization is expected. However, in the transitional economies
the system for trading shares - the market for ownership - is not highly developed and lack of
transparency, uncertainty about registration and implementation of ownership rights might be an
important barrier for the post-privatization dynamics.
The most important institutions for the dynamics of ownership are:
- competition on the product market
- bankruptcy procedures, securing the take-over by creditors in case of default
- legislation on registration, transfer, and enforcement of ownership rights
- the development of the financial system for supply of loans to enterprises
- the development of the stock exchange and a market for ownership of firms
The legislation on bankruptcy procedures was developed quite early in Estonia, September
1992. The law was strictly enforced so already by 1995 more than 1000 bankruptcy procedures
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had been implemented. Therefore, take-overs of liquidated assets can be assumed to play an
important role in the ownership dynamics in Estonia. This is not the case in the two other
countries. Also in Latvia and Lithuania bankruptcy laws were passed in 1992, but the
implementation was relatively weak. The legislation has been strengthened in Latvia in 1996 and
in Lithuania in 1997 and the implementation have been tightened in the latest years.
Figure 5-5 - Overview over institutions important for corporate governance
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Product market
Competitive pressure
very high because of
totally liberal trade
increasing increasing
Bankruptcy system
EBRD-score*
strict legislation 1992
tough enforcement
4-
strict legislation 1996
tighter enforcement
3+
Strict legislation 1997
tighter enforcement
3
Commercial law*
Shareholders rights
extensiveness    3+
effectiveness      4-
extensiveness    4-
effectiveness      3
extensiveness    4
effectiveness      3
Financial system
Loans to private firms
% of GDP
1997
856 mill $
19%
1998
1101mill$
20%
1997
510 mill $
9%
1998
842 mill $
13%
1997
907 mill$
9%
1998
1065 mill$
10%
Stock market
Start stock exchangeMay 1996 July 1995 September 1993
Listed  firms
Capitalization stocks mill $
% of GDP
turnover  stocks  mill$
turnover/capitalization
% foreign portfolio
1997       
  28
1147 
26%
1594
1.34
42%
1998
25
619
11%
950
1.61
45%
1997
50
337
6%
80
0.24
1998
69
396
6%
61
0.16
1997
516
1295
14%
85
0.07
1998
611
1074
11%
223
0.21
* EBRD Transition Report 1999, the score with max 4+ covers the result of a survey of experts and private law firms
on bankruptcy and commercial law. Capital market based on data from central banks and stock exchanges.
The legislation on registration, transfer and enforcement of ownership rights connected to
the commercial code, laws on joint stock companies etc. are quite developed in all three countries.
However, according to an EBRD-survey the implementation of the laws are somewhat behind in
Latvia and Lithuania.
The financial system developed relatively fast in Estonia. Already in 1992-93 the system was
strengthened after a major financial crisis. In Latvia there was an even more serious banking crisis
in 1995 involving the largest commercial bank in Latvia. In Lithuania three of the largest banks
were in crisis in the end of 1995 and 1996. In both countries the banking crisis have been followed
by a period of consolidation.
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In spite of a crisis for some medium banks in 1998 Estonia has now a relatively strong
financial system. The two largest banks have been taken over by Swedish investors and they
constitute now the strongest banks in the Baltics. Also in the two other countries the banking
system have been in a positive development the latest years. However, the crisis in Russia has
delayed the consolidation and some medium sized banks have been closed or merged. In Estonia
loans to private enterprises made up 12% already in 1994, by 1997 it had increased to 19%. In
Latvia and Lithuania the similar figure was 9% by 1997. This development is also reflected in the
development of interest rates which reached a level under 20% for long term loans in 1994 in
Estonia. This happened 1-2 years later in Latvia and Lithuania. Therefore, bank credits have had
higher importance for the situation of corporate governance in Estonian companies compared to
the situation in the other two countries, but with the consolidation of the banking system we find
an increasing importance for the bank loans in all three countries.
The Tallinn Stock Exchange was opened in May 1996. Before that time some trading of
shares had taken place in the over the counter market. The development of the public offerings for
minority shares facilitated the development of the exchange, but there has been no strong relation
between the privatization process and the development of the stock exchange. The firms
dominating the main list are the big commercial banks which were started as private entities. A few
large companies have been added after their privatization. In general the Tallinn stock exchange
is characterized by a low number of companies - only 25 by the end of 1998. A few of them are
heavily traded, especially a few large banks dominate the turnover. There have been quite high
volatility since the start in 1996. Foreigners are strongly involved both with portfolio investment
and in the control of core-holdings. From 1998 Swedish ownership of the two largest Estonian
banks makes up a big proportion of the Western ownership of shares listed at the Tallinn Stock
Exchange. By the end of 1998 the foreign share of the listed stocks were 45% (Bank of Estonia).
 The capitalization and turnover on the Riga Stock Exchange are considerably lower than
in Estonia, see figure 5-5. However, the Latvian stock exchange has developed quite rapidly in the
latest years in close connection with the acceleration of privatization of large companies and of
public offerings of shares. Of the 67 companies listed on the Riga Stock Exchange in 1998, 59 are
privatized companies.
The National Stock Exchange of Lithuania (NSEL) was established already in September
1993. The early start is closely connected to the high speed of privatization in the early years of
transition in Lithuania. Many of the enterprise involved in large privatization were listed on the
Lithuanian Stock Exchange, so the number of enterprises listed have been much higher than in the
other Baltic countries. In the second and third stage of privatization many of the minority state
holdings were sold directly on stock exchange. However, most of the companies have been
relatively small compared to the average listed company in Estonia. Only 4 companies were listed
on the main list in Lithuania, less than half of the numbers in Estonia and Latvia. Even, including
all the more than 600 enterprises listed in Lithuania, the capitalization in relation to GDP was not
higher in Lithuania than in Estonia, see figure 5-5. The main problem in Lithuania, however, has
been very thin trading, so the price set at NSEL has not been a good indicator for the market value
of the shares in most of the listed companies.
The three Baltic stock exchanges have started a cooperation with the aim of a high degree
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of integration including the start of a common Baltic list of blue-chip stocks. This integration will
probably further accelerate the strengthening of regulation and transparency which has happened
in the latest years in all three exchanges.
The development of the exchanges are, however, relevant for only the few very large
companies. For all the small and medium and most of the larger enterprises the development in
competition, the general development in legislation and enforcement, and the development of the
credit system is the decisive variables for the corporate governance environment. In these areas
Estonia have had a reasonable functioning system since the mid of the 1990s, while for Latvia and
Lithuania the same level was not reached before 1997-98. In the following sections we will look
at the effects on the dynamics of ownership and on economic performance and restructuring.
6. Results of privatization - Estonia
6.1 The ownership structure after privatization
Figure 6.1-1 gives an overview over the distribution of ownership in an  Estonian sample
of 666 enterprises at the time of privatization before January 1995 (Jones and Mygind, 1998).  83
enterprises privatized during 1995 and 1996 were included in the 255 state (and municipality)
owned enterprises. 6 enterprises did not give information about their ownership at the time of
privatization. Among the 405 responding private enterprises (666-255-6) there are slightly more
outside owned than insider owned. Enterprises with outside majority dominated by domestic
owners constitutes 31% of the private enterprises or 19% of the total. Outside majority with
foreign dominance are at the same level as inside majority with employee dominance - 22% of the
private enterprises or 13% of the total. Inside majority with management dominance makes up
16% of the private enterprises and 10% of the total enterprises. 6% had no majority for either
state, outsiders or insiders.
Based on information about the total distribution of enterprises for different size groups
and branches a "normalization" for the whole economy can  be calculated, see figure 6.1-1. The
proportion of foreign ownership out of the total number of firms with 5 or more employees
increases in this calculation because foreign ownership is very high in trade (35% of trade
enterprises), including a high number of enterprises. Foreign ownership was also strong in
transport (20%) and services (18%). Employee ownership was most widespread in agriculture
(39%) and lowest in transport (3%) in January 1995. Manager ownership was most widespread
in fishing, mining and wood production (27%) and lowest in trade (6%). However, by January
1997 the share of manager ownership for the whole economy increased to 26%, and for trade to
13%, (not reported in the table).
A normalization based on capital show that foreign ownership amounted to 37% of the
nominal capital for the privatized enterprises on January 1995. However, if calculations are made
according to the number of firms, then foreign ownership is found to play a smaller role. This is
because the nominal capital is much higher in foreign owned companies (Mygind 1995).
There is no clear tendency in the distribution between different private ownership types
concerning the average size measured as the average employment in 1994. However, state owned
enterprises tend to be relatively large with an average size of 205 employees. A few very large
state owned enterprises account for this result - the median state owned enterprises are on the
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level with the whole sample. The high number of small foreign owned trading companies explains
why foreign ownership is most common for small enterprises, (average of 66 employees). Also
insider majority owned enterprises with management dominance tend to be rather small.
Comparing these results with the situation of ownership in January 1997 and average employment
in 1996 (not reported in the figure) it is striking that most of the large employee dominated
enterprises in the sample have disappeared.
The Statistical Office of Estonia has done a survey representing all active enterprises in
Estonia. Some of the results are given in table 6.3-1. The distribution of ownership fits quite well
with the earlier analysis based on the smaller sample.  The enterprises that remained state or
municipal owned by 1997 were relatively large and foreign owned companies were on average
larger than the domestic owned enterprises. In the period 1995 to 1997 the relative weight of net
sales in the public sector has been halved from 18% to 9%. However, the table show  that  the
number of foreign enterprises only makes up 6% of the total, indicating that there might be a
number of inactive foreign owned Apaper@ companies. It is also striking that the foreign enterprises
have on average nearly around the double size measured as number of employees in comparison
with other private enterprises. Looking at other indicators such as sales the share of foreign owned
enterprises increases to 19% by the end of 1997 or by assets the share is 18%. Still the small
sample results in a higher proportion of foreign enterprises. The difference might be explained by
ESA using the legal definition of foreign ownership, and not all foreign owned enterprises are
formally registered as such.
 Capital intensity both measured as total assets per employee and nominal capital per
employees is relatively high in foreign owned enterprises and relatively low for insider owned
enterprises. For the small sample in January 1995 the nominal capital per employee is only 2000
EEK per employee or less for more than half of the insider owned enterprises. The average number
of 299000 EEK per employee in foreign owned companies versus 4000 EEK in employee
dominated enterprises show a striking difference. For total assets the difference is Aonly@ ten times
higher in foreign owned than in insider owned. These results can also be found for the data for
1993 and 1994 (Mygind 1997a p. 31). Table 6.3-1 for the total population of larger enterprises
confirms the tendency of a quite high capital-intensity in foreign owned enterprises although the
tendency is much less significant than for the small and earlier data-set.
The results can probably partly be explained by the fact that outsiders especially foreigners
can afford enterprises with a higher capital per employee. Also, typically foreign owners have paid
a price that is relatively high (at least compared to insiders) for similar enterprises. Relatedly,
foreign ownership became more prevalent in the later stages, with insiders dominating during the
early stages of the privatization process.
This last point is supported by the observation that insider takeovers were especially
important during the early stages of privatization. This is shown at the bottom of figure 6.1-1.
Insider ownership was very important especially in 1991, when takeovers with broad employee
ownership were quite prevalent. During 1992-1994, after the ending of preferences for insiders,
we see that the percentage of nominal capital owned by outsiders has become more important. In
1995 and 1996, 65 out of 243 state owned enterprises were privatized. It is worth noting that in
this group there were no cases of insider majority with employee dominance. Nearly half of the
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responding enterprises (46%) went to majority outside domestic ownership, 16% to majority
foreign ownership, 25% to management dominated insider ownership, and 7% to no majority.
The variation in the incidence of employee ownership also applies across individuals as well
as firms. Even in majority owned enterprises on average 46% of the employees were not owners
in 1995, and the percentage of non-owners were increasing over time. The participation rate for
all enterprises varies enormously across sectors, from 78% in agriculture to less than 10% in hotels
and restaurants and transport. Also at the individual level employee ownership seems to be most
stable in small enterprises, and more small enterprises have a fairly equal distribution between the
employee owners compared to the situation in larger enterprises. Based on the sample it is
estimated that for the whole economy 29% of the employees were owners in 1995 falling to
around 25% in January 1997 (Jones and Mygind 1998).
6.2  Dynamics of ownership - Estonia
The privatization process and the start of new firms are only the start of the development
of new ownership structures. By using our survey data we are able to examine changes in
ownership in sample firms between the time of privatization and subsequent times, (for details see
Jones and Mygind, 1998).
At the top of table 6.1-1 results for the ownership structure on time of privatization and
on January 1995 and 1997 are shown. Not surprisingly the number of state and municipal owned
enterprises have fallen. Many of them have moved to the no answer category, which also include
enterprises closed down. Out of 76 "no answers", 47 are known to be closed state owned enter-
prices. Among the private enterprises the number with foreign dominance is stable while domestic
owned and management owned enterprises are increasing and enterprises with insider majority
with employee dominance are falling.
Table 6.1-1 shows that at the time of privatization there were 28 employee dominated
enterprises with more than 100 employees in the sample. By January 1997 this number had fallen
to 9. For the similar enterprises with less than 100 employees the numbers fell from 60 at the time
of privatization to 42 in January 1997. Normalized for the whole economy employee ownership
had in 1995 a higher proportion in large enterprises (17%) than in small (10%), but in 1997 the
proportion of employee ownership in large enterprises fell to 7% (not reported). For management
dominated enterprises especially the number of small enterprises in the sample increased. Domestic
outside majority owned enterprises increased their share especially for large enterprises.
To analyze the dynamics more closely we present two transition matrices. Figure 6.2-1
shows the same ownership categories presented earlier, comparing the change from the situation
at the time of privatization and the situation on January 1997. The earlier shown fall in employee
ownership from 88 to 52 enterprises is shown, but additionally it can be seen that this change
covers a stable group of 38 enterprises combined with a deduction of 50 enterprises and an
addition of 14 enterprises. The flow away from employee dominance has gone mainly to
management dominance, 21 cases, and to domestic outside ownership, 17 cases. Only 4
enterprises have developed in the other direction from management to employee dominance and
only 3 from domestic to employee ownership. Management ownership has got 14 case from
domestic outside ownership and 16 cases from state ownership. It is revealing to see that the
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number with no clear majority ownership group has fallen from 38 to 17, indicating a strong
tendency in Estonia for an ownership configuration to emerge in which there is a clear core-owner.
Most of the no-majority cases have gone to domestic and management ownership.
Excluding the no-answer group and the state-owned group, only looking at changes within
the private ownership enterprises giving information for the two dates, 100 enterprises have
changed category while 232 have been stable. This means a change of 100/332 = 30% in the
period of approximately 3 years - a quite dynamic ownership adjustment. From the time of
privatization to January 1995 this transition percentage was 71/405 = 18%, from 1995 to 1996
it was 52/373 = 14%, and from 1996 to 1997 it was 60/378 = 16%. (The sum of the three periods
is less than 30 because a firm can change more than once).
Figure 6.2-2 shows a transition matrix for employee ownership comparing the time of
privatization and January 1997. There is a clear tendency so that the frequency of the high degree
employee ownership are falling and the frequency of the low degree of employee ownership are
increasing. The cases with 0% employee shares includes mainly state owned enterprises. Thus the
fall in this category reflects privatization. From the matrix it can be seen that the 85 enterprises
with 50-100% employee ownership at the time of privatization has been reduced to 36 enterprises.
The enterprises have transferred mainly to the neighboring categories 10-30% and 30-50%, but
some majority employee owned enterprises has also transferred to the lowest categories of
employee ownership. Only 45 enterprises have jumped to a category with higher employee
ownership and of these 41 enterprises have jumped from 0, indicating that it covers mainly
privatization cases. 80 enterprises have moved in the other direction. A similar transition matrix
for management ownership (not shown) shows complementing tendencies: fall in the low
categories and an increasing number of enterprises in the high categories of management
ownership. This is not surprising seen in combination with the earlier mentioned tendency of
transfer from employee to management ownership.
6.3 Ownership and economic performance - Estonia
To assess the economic performance of different ownership structures the  initial
conditions - size, capital-intensity and profitability - must be taken into consideration. We have
already shown how foreign owned enterprises have a relatively high capital-intensity while the
opposite is the case for insider owned enterprises. Because, insiders especially concerning small
enterprises often had the first choice it could be expected that they had Askimmed the cream@. We
have relatively few observations with information about profitability before privatization, and we
do not have any significant results indicating that insiders took over the most profitable enterprises
(Mygind 1997b). However, insiders might have acquired their enterprises at a relatively low price
as also indicated by the early small privatization. Foreign investors on the other hand have
advantage in the access to capital and have been able to buy highly capital intensive enterprises.
Data on performance can be taken from the sample of 666 enterprises covering the period
1993-97 with detailed ownership information and financial variables and the financial survey 1997
done by ESA covering all large enterprises and a representative sample of small enterprises, with
information on foreign, but without information on insider ownership, see table 6.3-1. We will
look at key variables such as sales, adjustment of labor, productivity, wages, profitability, financial
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sources and investment.
In a multivariate analysis based on the early data it was found that state-owned enterprises
were significantly more reluctant to reduce the labor force. To some extent this was also the case
for majority employee-owned enterprises, because the wage was used as a buffer instead of
employment. For upwards adjustments of employment the early results show a tendency to
increase employment relatively more in majority employee- and management owned enterprises
(Mygind 1997, p. 33).
In the large data set for 1997 based on simple averages sales per employee are by far the
highest for the group of foreign owned enterprises, and they have also the highest share of exports.
Labor-productivity is also the highest for foreign owned companies although the difference is not
so significant indicating that foreign owned enterprises only process a relatively small part of the
whole value chain in Estonia.
Results based on simple averages give a strong weight to large companies, and it does not
count for a number of other relevant factors such as size, sector, location, fixed enterprise effects,
etc. For Estonia we have made some more sophisticated analysis on total factor productivity
including these factors (Jones and Mygind, 1999c). The analysis is based on panel-data for the
period 1993-1997. Depending on the exact specification of the model the analysis show that
private ownership has 13-15% higher factor productivity than state ownership. Majority ownership
by foreigners are 19-21% higher, majority management ownership 15-31% higher, and majority
ownership by a broad group of employees 13-24% higher that state ownership. These results are,
noteworthy, both because of the high reliability and because standard theory would not expect so
high efficiency by insider owned enterprises.
The high labor productivity of foreign owned enterprises can to a high extent be explained
by the high capital intensity, but if the productivity of capital is relatively low it will turn out as low
total factor productivity. The high labor productivity for foreign owned enterprises might also
partly be explained by high advantages in recruitment of labor. On average foreign companies pay
much higher salaries than their domestic counterparts in the private sector. This was both the case
in 1997 and for earlier years. Data for October 1994 on wage levels for different occupational
groups shows that both foreign owned and domestic outside owned enterprises had quite high
wage levels. The levels for insider owned enterprises were relatively low indicating that they hold
back wages in times of trouble (Mygind 1997a).
Profitability measures for the early years show that insider ownership has quite high
profitability, while foreign especially for return on assets are quite low for foreign ownership.
However, this might be connected with high levels of assets, which at this point in time have not
started to pay off. The surprisingly high profitability measures in table 6.3-1 for state owned
enterprises might be explained by the dominance of some natural monopolies doing quite well in
1997 - e.g. telecommunication and energy. There are no significant differences between domestic
and foreign ownership in the private sector.
The indicators for investment level in 1997 point out that foreign owned companies take
the lead in relation to domestic private enterprises. The high level for public enterprises might
again be explained by sector specific factors. Investment data for earlier years for the small sample
shows in a multivariate analysis with total assets and number of employees as explanatory variables
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and with control for branch and location that foreign owned enterprises clearly have the highest
investment level (Mygind 1997). 
On average 80% of the investment were financed by internal funds, but for foreign owned
enterprises this percentage was only 64%. Foreign owned companies had a relatively high
financing by banks. Insider owned enterprises on the other hand have much less debt and bank
loans per employee than the average for the whole group (Mygind 1997).
The data for 1997 show that private enterprises have a faster turnover of their assets and
a higher debt/equity ratio than state enterprise. Within the private group domestic enterprises have
a faster turnover of assets than their foreign counterpart, again indicating that foreign enterprises
still not have employed their huge capital assets in the most efficient way. The higher debt/equity
ratio in domestic firms compared with foreign ownership can better be explained by low equity
than by a high level of debt.
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Appendix 6
Figure 6.1-1 Estonia: Ownership January 1995 ( plus Jan.1997),
size 1994, capital intensity, time of privatization.
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Figure 6.2-1  Estonia - majority at privatization by majority January 1997
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outsiders Insiders
majority at time
of privatization
state
foreign domesticManagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
state 110 
(43)
15
(6)
33
(13)
16
(6)
2
(1)
3
(1)
76
(30)
255
(100)
outsider
foreign>domestic
0
(0)
64
(72)
1
(1)
3
(3)
1
(1)
1
(1)
19
(21)
89
(100)
outsider
domestic>foreign
0
(0)
2
(2)
79
(63)
14
(11)
3
(3)
2
(2)
25
(20)
125
(100)
insider
managers>employees
0
(0)
1
(2)
5
(8)
44
(68)
4
(6)
2
(3)
9
(14)
65
(100)
insider
employees>managers
0
(0)
1
(1)
17
(19)
21
(24)
38
(43)
2
(2)
9
(10)
88
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
3
(8)
9
(24)
5
(13)
3
(8)
7
(18)
11
(29)
38
(100)
no answer 0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(17)
3
(50)
1
(17)
0
(0)
1
 (17)
6
(100)
total 
privatization
255
(38)
89
(13)
125
(19)
65
(10)
88
(13)
38
(6)
6
(1)
666
(100)
total
Jan. 1995
243
(36)
96
(14)
144
(22)
83
(12)
74
(11)
26
(4)
0
(0)
666
(100)
total
Jan. 1996
162
(24)
89
(13)
155
(23)
94
(14)
71
(11)
21
(3)
74
(11)
666
(100)
total
Jan. 1997
110
(17)
86
(13)
145
(22)
106
(16)
52
(8)
17
(3)
150
(23)
666
(100)
44
Figure 6.2-2  Estonia - employee ownership at privatization by Jan. 1997
Time of
privatization
January 1997
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Figure 6.3-1 Estonia: economic performance 1997 - large sample
state municipal domestic
private
foreign
private
total
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average number of employees 211 42 12 22 15
net sales 1995            mill EEK16805 (15) 3146 (3)74205 (65)17431 (16)111588 100
net sales 1997            mill EEK13489 (7) 4412 (2)128901(71)33816 (19)180618 100
sales per employee   1000 EEK 309 237 427 886 449
percentage export 18% 1% 22% 31% 23%
value added               mill EEK4069 (15) 952 (3)17981 (66)3961 (15) 27217 100
value added per employee 93 51 60 104 68
staff cost per employee 78 58 48 80 55
total assets                 mill EEK14401 (13) 6456 (6)71494 (63)20819 (18)113171 100
total assets/employee     ultimo 330 346 236 545 281
tangible assets/employee     ult.208 259 88 226 122
change in tangible assets be-
fore depreciation per employee
26 50 33 52 35
new tangible assets per empl. 76 87 29 59 40
new plant and equipment/empl 25 24 12 21 15
increase of fixed assets    % 8 18 40 22 27
return on equity 11.5 -0.7 8.9 8.5 8.6
return on total assets 7.8 -0.4 3.2 3.4 3.7
gross profit to net sales 15.7 14.8 10.7 11.6 11.3
asset turnover 1.01 0.74 2.17 1.81 1.85
debt/equity 0.48 0.75 1.96 1.52 1.47
Based on ESA - Statistical Office of Estonia, Financial Statistics of Enterprises 1997, I.
12 148 enterprises were surveyed.
State and municipal and larger private were included 100%, while a sample was drawn from the smaller ones.
Simple averages - a few large companies have a relatively high weight.
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7. The results of privatization - Latvia
7.1 The ownership structure after privatization - Latvia
Table 7.1-1 show ownership distribution for 5589 enterprises for January 1995 (Jones and
Mygind, 1998). At this time most of the small privatization had been done, while most of the
larger enterprises were still not privatized. The ownership distribution is quite interesting since
typically one group of owners has more than 50% of the ownership and in only 2% of the
enterprises did no group of owners have a majority of the ownership. Although one group could
consist of a number of individuals we can take this distribution as an indication of a high degree
of concentration.
In 16% of cases, enterprises were mainly owned by the state, 5% of the firms were owned
by foreigners, 26% by domestic outsiders while in 51% of firms insiders owned more than 50%.
Based on a survey on managers in 167 enterprises we have evidence for the distribution
between managers and other employees in companies. These results are in figure 7.1-2 used to
divide the insider ownership in two groups. However, it must be noted that this procedure includes
some modifications since the 73 enterprises with majority insider ownership is not a representative
sample of the total. First of all they have 20 or more employees. From the small sample we can
see that employee and management dominance have the same frequency for enterprises with 20
or more employees, and we assume this is also the case for the large sample.
As can be seen from figure 7.1-1 state ownership was still quite high in manufacturing in
January 1995 with, the state having majority in around 24% of the enterprises. In particular, the
state maintains a strong ownership stake among the largest enterprises and 54% of firms with
more than 500 employees were still predominantly state owned in January 1995. This result is
consistent with the time-profile of large privatization in Latvia. The state owned less than 15% of
enterprise  with fewer than 100 employees. These small enterprises have mainly been taken over
or are started by insiders and more than 50% of companies with fewer than 100 employees are
majority insider owned. More than two thirds of enterprises with 1- 4 employees were majority
insider owned. For enterprises with more than 500 employees the corresponding figure is only 18.
Most of the enterprises with majority insider ownership in 1995 were 100% owned by insiders.
It is striking that for enterprises with 20-199 employees there are slightly more management
owned enterprises than employee owned. However, for large enterprises with more than 200
employees we have no enterprises with management dominance in our small sample of 167
enterprises.
Foreign ownership are relatively low on average 5% in the large sample of 1995, but here
is a clear tendency to an increasing proportion with increasing size, rising from 3% for the smallest
group to 6% for the largest enterprises.
We have data also for another large sample from ultimo 1997. Here the classification of
ownership is based on the code indicated by the enterprise register of Latvia. In this data foreign
ownership makes up as much as 17% of the total, and again highest for the largest enterprises
(24%). The difference from January 1995 to the end of 1997 is both due to an increase in foreign
ownership, and some change in definitions. Some enterprises with minority foreign ownership are
included in the foreign ownership group in the enterprise register..
By the end of 1997 only a very small proportion of enterprises were still state or municipal
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owned in sectors such as manufacturing, construction and trade (less than 6%), but public
ownership was still strong in utilities sectors such as electricity, water and gaz and in the broad
group of services, including branches such as health, education and liberal and social services.
Foreign ownership was low in these sectors and in agriculture, but high in the other sectors.
From the 1995 data it can be seen that there is substantial dispersion in the extent of insider
ownership across sectors. Insider ownership was highest in agriculture and fishing and lowest in
transport and services. From the small sample it can be seen that the bulk of insider owned
enterprises in agriculture and fishing were broadly owned by employees, in manufacturing there
is about balance, while managers were dominating in sectors such as construction, trade and
transport.
Table 7.1-1 shows some data for capital intensity, measured as nominal capital per
employee. There is a similar tendency like in Estonia that enterprises with insider majority have
much lower (around ten times lower) capital intensity than other enterprises.  This is also
confirmed by the data from the small sample. These data do not point to significant differences
between management and employee dominated enterprises. Like in Estonia foreign owned
enterprises and state owned enterprises have quite high capital intensity.
A distribution based on the year of privatization for the small sample is shown at the
bottom of the table. However, from these results no clear tendencies can be seen, so a tendency
to lower insider or lower employee ownership in later stages of privatization cannot be confirmed.
Only in the small sample of 167 enterprises we can distinguish between new started and
privatized enterprises. The proportion of new started enterprises is clearly highest among the small
enterprises. The division of new and privatized on different ownership groups can be seen from
table 7.1-3. Although, the sample is quite small the following strong tendencies can be assumed
to have general validity. Foreign ownership is mainly established as completely new entities. We
assume that this is the case for small enterprises - sales outlets etc, while larger foreign owned
enterprises are mainly the result of privatization. Managerial owned enterprises are dominantly
started as new entities, while on the other hand broadly employee owned enterprises are mostly
established in the privatization process. Note, however, that the distinction of new and privatized
might not be so clear in reality since most entities categorized as new all to some extent use
privatized assets. The process in which these assets were acquired can be part of the formal
privatization procedure or part of more informal processes.
From the study of the 167 enterprises we have evidence about the distribution within the
group of employees (Jones and Mygind, 1998). The tendency known from Estonia with a more
equally distributed ownership in small enterprises cannot be confirmed in the Latvian sample.
There is not a tendency for an increasing number of non-owners from 1994 to 1996 like it was the
case in Estonia. For both years about one third of the employees in the sample own shares in their
own enterprise. The distribution of shares among the employee is rather equal for half of the
enterprises with some insider ownership and Aunequal@ for 25% and Avery unequal@ for the
remaining 25%. This is the same pattern as in Estonia, but in Latvia the numbers do not show a
significant variation between different size groups.
7.2 Dynamics of ownership - Latvia
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The dynamics of ownership in Latvia can be examined by constructing transition matrices
based on the survey of the 167 enterprises analyzed for the period 1993-1996 (Jones and Mygind,
1998). In the transition matrix shown in figure 7.2-1 the results in the end of 1994 are compared
with the results ultimo 1996. We have not gone back to 1993 since the number of non-answers
is as high as 28%. The enterprises were asked in 1997 about their ownership structure in the
preceding four years. The reliability of the data is probably falling the further back in time we go,
and there is likely to be a tendency of under reporting changes in ownership since it is simply easier
to answer Aunchanged@ instead of specifying the changes. Even with this concern, the transition
matrix do show some interesting developments. 4 companies have been privatized from 1994 to
1996. 5 out of 34 enterprises with domestic outside ownership have changed, and most markedly
7 out of 37 employee dominated insider majority have changed, 3 to management dominance, 3
to domestic ownership and one to no majority. Looking at the summary table at the bottom there
is a tendency for foreign ownership, management ownership and no majority ownership to
increase.
The tendency from Estonia with falling employee ownership is also reflected in the
transition matrix in figure 7.2-2. The ownership is especially shifting from employees to managers
like it was the case in Estonia, although there is a weaker tendency in the Latvian data. Measuring
the speed of change for majority ownership (excluding changes including state and no-answers)
show a change between 4% and 7% year to year, and a 18% change from 1993 to 1996. This is
about half the speed of change compared to Estonia. This can probably partly be explained by a
bias in the data-collection method, but it also indicates a more open and dynamic market for
ownership in Estonia. (In fact, an analysis of 694 enterprises on ownership in 1994 and 1995
without division of the group of insiders in managers and other employees, show that the
ownership change is 7.6% compared to 3.7% in the small sample of 167 enterprises, (Jones and
Mygind, 1998)).
Still the general picture is a quite low degree of change. This is confirmed by the data from
the large sample with broad owner groups based on the enterprise-register categorization, figure
7.2-3. Although the matrix covers a period of three years the change between groups are very
small. Most markedly, the privatization process is cutting the number of state owned enterprises
by 20%. 14 out of the 100 going from state to other forms become foreign owned. Foreign owned
companies have taken over 51 firms from the private domestic enterprises and have sold 20 the
other way. The number of foreign owner enterprises has increased by 20% over the 3 years
through privatization and takeovers. On top of this come new established enterprises for which
we do not have any numbers. Here we find probably a more important contributor to the increase
in the number of foreign enterprises, while a few large privatizations make this the most important
road for foreign ownership when measured as the value of the assets.
Figure 7.2-4 shows a matrix for the dynamics during 1997. Again the low dynamics is
striking. However, it should be noted that the main dynamics is excluded, because of the broad
categorization of the group of private domestic enterprises. As shown before the main dynamics
takes place within this group, namely, as management take-over of the majority from the broad
group of employees.
Finally, the matrix for the dynamics of foreign ownership during 1997, figure 7.2-5,  shows
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the stability of ownership structures. There are 54 cases with foreign ownership shifting to a higher
category and 35 cases going in the opposite direction. In the upward direction, 5 cases are jumping
from 0% to majority foreign ownership, while 10 cases takes the smaller step from 30-50% to
majority. In fact, the shifts in the matrix, shows that a process of a gradual takeover by foreigners
is more frequent than one-step takeovers.
7.3  Ownership and some indicators of economic performance - Latvia
Figure 7.3-1 and -2 gives some indicators of the performance of 1997 for the large sample,
but only for quite broad ownership groups. Further information on insider ownership for the early
period is taken from Mygind 1997a.
As earlier mentioned for the initial condition around privatization we found that insider
owned enterprises, and especially manager-owned enterprises have a quite low capital intensity,
while foreign owned enterprises on the other hand have a very high capital intensity. Insider owned
enterprises tend to be relatively small. We do not have any information about profitability before
1994.
Growth in sales for 1997 is like in Estonia highest for foreign enterprises, and private are
higher than state.
A multivariate analysis based on the early data show that labor-adjustment in Latvia are
considerably lower than in Estonia and Lithuania. Only foreign ownership show some more
dynamic adjustments (Jones, Mygind and Rahman 1996). Foreign owned enterprises have the
highest growth in employment in 1997, and private is higher than state (figure 7.3-2).
Production function analysis based on cross sections from 1994 and 1995 do not show any
significant differences in factor productivity between ownership groups (Jones and Mygind,
1999b). However, the 1997-data show that labor productivity is much higher for foreign owned
enterprises than it is the case for the remaining groups, see figure 7.3-2.
For the 1997-data the wage level is like in Estonia clearly the highest in foreign owned
enterprises, while other private enterprises are lower than state owned enterprises, see table 7.3-2.
We have not yet results on the wage level in insider owned enterprises.
The profitability measures from 1997, figure 7.3-2 show that private enterprises have
higher profit margins than state owned (but there are no big variation within the group). However,
foreign enterprises are doing worse than their domestic counterpart on return on assets. This result
is confirmed on multivariate analysis on earlier data. Like in Estonia, foreign owned companies
cannot in this stage report profits following the relatively high level of assets. The highest returns
on assets are found in enterprises with insider majority (Mygind 1997a p. 37).
Looking at the capital structure a multi-variate analysis for the 1995 data show that the
debt ratio for insider-owned enterprises is significantly higher than for state owned enterprises.
Bank loans is, however, significantly lower the more insiders own, and bank loans per employee
are relatively low for insider owned enterprises (Mygind 1997 p. 40). Figure 7.3-1 shows that the
private enterprises in general have a higher debt/equity ratio than state owned enterprises and that
foreign owned have a slightly lower ratio than other private enterprises. However, foreign
enterprises have the highest bank loans per employee and also slightly higher access to long term
loans than the other companies.
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The 1997 data show that netinvestment per employee is the highest in foreign owned
enterprises and private is higher than state, figure 7.3-2.  Analysis on earlier data shows the same
tendency, and shows also that insider tend to be higher than outside domestic owned enterprises
(Mygind 1997a, p. 41).
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Appendix 7.
Figure 7.1-1    Latvia: Ownershipstructure, January 1, 1995
                        size, branches, capital intensity
Majority
outsiders insiders
frequency
(row percent)
State
foreign>domdomestic>f total managers>e employees>m
no
majo-
rity
total
TOTAL 895 (16)279 (5)1464(26)2838 (51)36 (25)*37 (25)* 113 (2) 5589 (100)
EMPLOYEES
1-4
5-19
20-99
100-199
200-
47   (6)
196 (15)
366 (14)
119 (24)
165 (41)
23  (3)
62  (5)
141 (5)
28  (6)
25  (6)
161 (21)
332 (25)
693 (27)
160 (32)
118 (29)
528 (67)
681 (52)
1343 (52)
193 (39)
93 (23)
-
-
(29)*
(22)*
(0)*
-
-
(23)*
(17)*
(23)*
26 (3)
38 (3)
44 (2)
3 (1)
2 (0)
785 (100)
1311 (100)
2587 (100)
503 (100)
403 (100)
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
215
17
52
145
70
16
33
76
74
13
33
77
45
7
23
44
64*
25*
40*
102*
182*
38*
83*
184*
31
5
17
36
BRANCHES
agricult. fishing
mining wood
manufacturing
manufacturing
construction
trade
transport
service
72 (12)
93 (19)
130 (22)
51 (26)
102 (13)
217 (14)
75 (20)
153 (15)
5  (1)
29  (6)
36  (6)
13  (7)
15  (2)
105  (7)
49 (13)
27  (3)
124 (20)
101 (20)
92 (16)
19 (10)
180 (24)
379 (24)
112 (30)
453 (46)
406 (67)
269 (54)
310 (53)
108 (55)
455 (60)
825 (52)
130 (34)
332 (34)
(11)*
(27)*
(32)*
(14)*
(43)*
(39)*
(34)*
-
(56)*
(27)*
(21)*
(41)*
(17)*
(13)*
(0)*
-
2 (0)
7 (1)
12 (2)
4 (2)
7 (1)
47 (3)
11 (3)
23 (2)
609 (100)
499 (100)
580 (100)
195 (100)
759 (100)
1573 (100)
377 (100)
988 (100)
nominal capital
/employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
median
75% quart.
5289
380
1663
3965
6568
125
1137
5333
5170
99
538
2240
477
7
35
211
488*
4*
90*
1035*
630*
58*
195*
650*
3696
13
100
625
2846
20
165
1200
year of
privatization
1991
1992
1993
1994
total
8 (26)*
0   (0)*
4 (10)*
4 (29)*
16 (11)*
2   (6)*
4   (7)*
4 (10)*
1   (7)*
11 (8)*
3 (10)*
15 (27)*
14 (35)*
2 (14)*
34 (24)*
14 (35)*
35 (64)*
17 (43)*
7 (50)*
73 (52)*
7 (23)*
17 (31)*
7 (18)*
5 (36)*
36 (26)*
7 (18)*
18 (33)*
10 (25)*
2 (14)*
37 (26)*
4 (13)*
1  (2)*
1  (2)*
0  (0)*
6  (4)*
31 (100)*
55 (100)*
40 (100)*
14 (100)*
140 (100)*
* the numbers are based on the sample of 167 enterprises with 20 or more employees, percentages are
   normalized so the total equals insiders total, numbers for employees and nominal capital cannot be
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   directly compared with other ownership groups.
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Figure 7.1-2   Latvia: Ownershipstructure (register class.*), ult 1997
                        size, branches, year of registration
State coop private foreign total
EMPLOYEES
1997     total   N
0-19
20-99
100-199
200-
653  (18)
33    (5)
386  (18)
118  (25)
116  (35)
152   (4)
33   (5)
101   (5)
23   (5)
15   (5)
2196 (60)
466 (72)
1360 (62)
251 (52)
119 (36)
632 (17)
136 (21)
330 (15)
87 (18)
79 (24)
3633  (100)
648  (100)
2177  (100)
579  (100)
329  (100)
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
211
37
67
140
84
30
51
100
66
22
38
70
116
22
47
107
101
25
43
89
BRANCHES
agricult. fishing
mining wood
manufacturing
El., water, gas
construction
trade
hotels restaur.
transport
service
653  (18)
19    (7)
3  (10)
55    (6)
70  (90)
11    (3)
13    (2)
12  (14)
48  (18)
422  (48)
152    (4)
49  (18)
1    (3)
25    (3)
1    (1)
1    (0)
46    (6)
1    (1)
6    (2)
22    (3)
2196  (60)
197  (72)
18  (60)
650  (68)
7    (9)
332  (87)
543  (70)
47  (57)
144  (55)
258  (30)
632  (17)
9    (3)
8  (27)
229  (24)
0    (0)
38  (19)
176  (23)
23  (28)
62  (24)
87  (10)
3633 (100)
274 (100)
30 (100)
959 (100)
78 (100)
382 (100)
778 (100)
83 (100)
260 (100)
789 (100)
year of
registration
- 91
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
643  (18)
167  (23)
95  (12)
108  (14)
97  (16)
74  (22)
45  (18)
57  (44)
152    (4)
0    (0)
78  (10)
55    (7)
10    (2)
4    (1)
3    (1)
2    (2)
2196  (61)
476  (65)
532  (65)
442  (59)
342  (58)
184  (54)
167  (67)
53  (40)
632  (17)
93  (12)
119  (14)
149  (20)
140  (24)
76  (22)
36  (14)
19  (15)
3623 (100)
736 (100)
824 (100)
754 (100)
589 (100)
338 (100)
251 (100)
131 (100)
Table 7.1-3   Ownership on privatization/new - 1996
        \majority ownership state foreign domesticmanagerem-
ployee
no
majority
no
answer
total
Privatized 0 3 21 18 26 4 1 73
new started 0 10 14 32 5 10 0 71
state owned ultimo 199620 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
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Based on a survey of 167 enterprises performed spring 1997, (Mygind 1999)
Figure 7.2-1 Transition matrix Latvia - ultimo 1994 by ultimo 1996
Majority ultimo 1996
outsiders insidersmajorityultimo 1994 State
foreign domesticmanagers employees
No
Majo-
rity
no
answer
total
State 12 (75) 1 (6) 0 (0) 2 (13) 0 (0) 1 (6) 0 (0) 16 (100)
Outsider
Foreign>domestic
0 (0)10 (91) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 11 (100)
Outsider
Domestic>foreign
0 (0) 1 (3) 29 (85) 2 (6) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 34 (100)
Insider
Managers>employees
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 36 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 36 (100)
Insider
Employees>managers
0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (8) 3 (8) 30 (81) 1 (3) 0 (0) 37 (100)
no majority 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)6 (100) 0 (0) 6 (100)
no answer 1 (4) 1 (4) 2 (7) 0 (0) 2 (7) 1 (4) 20 (74) 27 (100)
Total 1993 15 (9) 7 (4) 29 (17) 29 (17) 34 (20) 6 (4) 47 (28)167(100)
Total 1994 16 (9) 11 (7)34 (20) 36 (22) 37 (22) 6 (4) 27 (16167(100)
Total 1995 14 (8) 13 (8)35 (21) 38 (23) 35 (21) 9 (5) 23 (14)167(100)
Total 1996 13 (8) 13 (8) 34 (20 44 (26) 33 (20) 10 (6)20 (12)167(100)
Figure 7.2-2  Latvia - employee ownership ultimo 1994 by ultimo 1996
Ultimo 1994 Ultimo 1996
Employeeshares0% 0-5% 5-10% 10-30%30-50%50-100%100%
no data  total
0% 60 (94)0   (0) 0   (0) 2   (3) 1   (2) 1   (2) 0   (0) 0   (0) 64 (100)
0-5% 1 (13)4 (50) 0   (0) 2 (25) 1 (13) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 8 (100)
5-10% 0   (0)1 (17) 4 (67) 1 (17) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 6 (100)
10-30% 2 (12)1   (6) 2 (12) 12 (71) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 17 (100)
30-50% 0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 2 (22) 6 (67) 1 (11) 0   (0) 0   (0) 9 (100)
50-100% 0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 4 (12) 3 (92) 27 (79) 0   (0) 0   (0) 34 (100)
100% 0   (0)0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0  (0) 0   (0) 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 (100)
no data 4 (15)0   (0) 0   (0) 1   (4) 0  (0) 2   (7) 0   (0) 20 (74) 27 (100)
total ult. 1993 53 (32)5   (3) 6   (4) 15   (9) 9  (5) 30 (18) 2   (1) 47 (28) 167 (100)
total ult. 1994 64 (38)8   (5) 6   (4) 17 (10) 34  (5) 34 (20) 2   (1) 27 (16) 167 (100)
total ult. 1995 67 (40)9   (6) 4   (2) 20 (12) 35  (5) 32 (19) 2   (1) 23 (14) 167 (100)
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total ult. 1996 67 (40)6   (4) 6   (4) 24 (14) 11  (7) 32 (19) 1   (1) 20 (12) 167 (100)
Figure 7.2-3   Latvia - transition-matrix - owner-categories 1994 on 1997
    Majority Jan. 1997
Majority Jan. 1994
state coop private
domestic
foreign mix Total
State 382  (79) 0   (0) 73  (15) 14   (3) 13   (3)482 (100)
Coop 0    (0) 123 (95) 6   (5) 0   (0) 0    (0)129 (100)
Private domestic 0    (0) 1   (0) 944 (95) 51   (5) 2    (0)998 (100)
Foreign 0    (0) 0   (0) 20   (9) 199 (88) 7    (3)226 (100)
Mix 3    (3) 1   (1) 71 (70) 9   (9) 17  (17)101 (100)
Total 385 (20) 125   (6)1114 (58) 273 (14) 39    (2)1936(100)
Based on enterprise register categorization by Latvian Statistical Bureau
Figure 7.2-4  Latvia transition-matrix majority primo 1997 by ultimo 1997
        Majority ultimo 
Majority primo 1997
state coop private
domestic
foreign No
majority
total
State 564  (94) 1    (0) 30    (5) 5    (1) 1    (0)601 (100)
Coop 0    (0) 35  (92) 1    (3) 2    (5) 0    (0) 38 (100)
Private domestic 7    (0) 1    (0)2405  (99) 13    (1) 3    (0)2429(100)
Foreign 0    (0) 0    (0) 7    (2) 321 (97) 2    (0)330 (100)
No majority 0    (0) 0    (0) 0    (0) 1 (14) 6  (86) 7 (100)
Total 571 (17) 37    (1)2443 (72) 342 (10) 12    (0)3405(100)
Based on balance-sheet data primo and ultimo 1997. 16 categorized as Aother@ hav  been excluded
Fig. 7.2-5  Latvia  -  foreign ownershare primo 1997 by ultimo 1997
     Ultimo
Primo
      0%    1-10%   11-30%   31-50%  51-100%   100%      total
0% 2789  (99) 5    (0) 10    (0) 8    (0) 5    (0) 0    (0)2817(100)
1-10% 1    (3) 26  (90) 0    (0) 1    (3) 1    (3) 0    (0) 29 (100)
11-30% 2    (4) 4    (7) 43  (80) 3    (6) 2    (4) 0    (0) 54 (100)
31-50% 3    (2) 3    (2) 7    (5) 128  (84) 10    (7) 2    (1)153 (100)
51-100% 2    (1) 0    (0) 0    (0) 5    (2) 212 (94) 7    (3)226 (100)
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100% 1    (1) 1    (1) 0    (0) 2    (1) 5    (4) 133  (94)142 (100)
Total 2798 (82) 39    (1) 60    (2) 147   (4)235    (7)142    (4)3421(100)
Based on balance sheet data
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Fig. 7.3-1 Latvia: Ownership (register class.*), ult. 97  capital-structure
state coop private foreign total
Equity             N
/employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
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0.05
0.18
0.54
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2.36
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0.44
0.29
1.12
3.24
9.03
19.57
632
9.35
0.15
0.92
2.38
6.57
12.48
3625
2.04
0.16
0.73
2.37
7.23
14.43
Bankcredits    N
/employee 1000lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
93
2947
74
401
2336
56
380
109
202
382
629
2302
165
571
1693
189
6534
245
1011
4074
967
3080
158
577
1936
58
Figure 7.3-2  Latvia: Ownership (register class.*) ultimo 97 - performance 
state       coop        private      foreign     total       
Value added/
Employee 1000 lat
Average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
491
2194
825
1404
2316
135
1760
918
1645
2550
1764
2977
967
1703
3218
487
7245
1752
3773
8624
2877
3509
985
1789
3531
sales growth   N
average          %
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
441
47
-7
9
29
130
7
-19
-3
12
1628
37
-5
16
53
466
53
4
25
67
2665
40
-6
15
49
Profitmargin  N
Average          %
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
493
-3
-6
4
16
146
10
3
10
21
2125
11
3
10
19
597
10
5
13
26
3361
9
3
10
19
Return on assets
Average          %
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
90% quantile
95% quantile
485
-2
-4
0
4
15
24
142
4
-4
1
6
17
21
2125
13
3
8
24
47
64
599
7
-4
6
20
38
54
3351
9
-1
5
20
41
59
salary per       N
employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
648
1413
937
1152
1586
141
892
626
849
1076
1828
1056
584
869
1320
520
2009
924
1565
2555
3137
1280
690
1017
1520
netinvestmentN
/employee 1000lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
90% quantile
95% quantile
648
1262
-31
116
446
1696
2978
141
89
-124
32
331
829
1159
1828
951
-100
157
806
2589
4936
520
4383
-66
622
3475
9489
19114
3137
1546
-85
167
857
3232
6550
growth in     N 
employment%
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
90% quantile
95% quantile
581
12
-7
0
7
25
51
138
13
-14
-3
5
26
114
1739
18
-8
2
21
58
107
501
25
-4
9
30
64
103
2959
18
-8
2
18
55
98
59
8. Results of privatization - Lithuania
8.1 The ownership structure after privatization
The following presentation is based on a small data set of around 350 enterprises in
manufacturing with detailed ownership data 1994-1996 and around 150 enterprises in construction
and trade with data for 1995-96 (Jones and Mygind 1998). Furthermore, we have a large data set
of 6-7000 enterprises for 1996 and 1997 with some ownership information. We have financial
information for all these enterprises collected by the Statistical Department of Lithuania. The data
do not distinguish between private new-started and privatized enterprises. The data covers mainly
enterprises with 20 or more employees. We assume that most of the large private enterprises are
privatized.
The first ownership survey, undertaken in July 1994, elicited responses from 356 industrial
enterprises. It confirms to some extent the rapid extension of insider ownership in large enterprises
in Lithuania. By July 1994 only 8% of these enterprises had no insider ownership and most of
these 25 enterprises were still state owned. 25% of the enterprises had 31-50% insider ownership,
and 18% of the enterpriss had majority insider ownership. Most of these enterprises have more
shares owned by the employees than by managers. In July 1994 in only 13% of  cases with some
insider ownership did managers own more equity than do the rest of employees. This result shows
a strong difference from the Estonian data where managers owned more than the other employees
in most cases.
The survey data also indicate that ownership by foreigners plays a limited role in Lithuania.
Only 6 of the manufacturing enterprises were owned by outsiders dominated by foreign investors,
see table 8.1-1. Some of the 4 enterprises privatized to foreigners in the Ahard currency
privatization@ are probably included here. A few of the foreign enterprises in the sample can also
be new or taken over by foreigners short after privatization.
As can be seen from table 8.1-1, 15% of the industrial enterprises had insider majority with
employee dominance and only 3% had insider majority with manager dominance in July 1994. As
the entries in the lower rows of figure 17 indicate, the degree of employee-ownership in July 1994
is not dependent on the time of privatization. The difference in relation to the distribution of
ownership at the time of privatization is probably the result of two tendencies from the
privatization date to July 1994 - a gradual takeover by employees through enterprise reserves and
profits, and secondly the sale of some employee shares, with the strongest effect in enterpri es
where employees owned a high proportion of the shares. The proportion of Ano major ty@ is quite
high in general and especially in enterprises privatized in 1993 and 1994. This can be explained by
the state still keeping a relatively high proportion of shares especially in the larger enterprises.
The Lithuanian industry sample consists of rather large enterprises with an average
employment in 1994 of 600 employees. Manager dominated insider majority has the largest
average, but the data do not reveal striking differences in the size-structure. There are also no clear
tendencies among the industrial branches shown in table 8.1-1.
The survey for construction was not undertaken before July 1995, but the results show
many of the same tendencies as in industry. Out of 148 enterprises only 6% had no employee
ownership in July 1995, and 40% had majority insider ownership, table 8.1-2. However, for
construction and trade there are more  enterprises with insider majority which have management
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dominance, 26%, compared to employee dominance, 14%. However, this difference from the
tendency in industry partly reflects the fact that the numbers for construction and trade are from
July 1995. Leaving one more year for the change of ownership from employees to managers.
There are no striking tendencies in the variation of ownership when comparing enterprises of
different sizes except for a weak tendency for higher management dominance in smaller
companies. Comparing construction and trade there are about the same degree of employee
ownership. However, managers are stronger in trade with 29% of the sample with insider majority
with manager dominance. In construction the percentage is 23%.
The large sample of enterprises with ownership data from January 1998 represents all
branches and for large enterprises we have full coverage. The ownership structure is based on
dominant owner, that is the largest owner group out of the five given in the table. However, there
is not much difference since in most cases the dominant owner has a majority of the shares.
Comparing tables 8.1-1, -2 and -3 it can be seen that the state owned enterprises has fallen
from 20% to 10%, construction from 12% to 6% while trade already in 1995 were down at a level
of 6%. State ownership is still quite high in enterprises related to agriculture and fishing, in service
and in water supply.
The group, domestic persons, covers both domestic outsiders and insiders. We assume that
most of the enterprises in this category are insider owned. Ownership by domestic enterprises
makes up 7%, and out of these is 2% of the total dominated by owners representing financial
enterprises. Ownership by banks and investment funds play a rather limited role in Lithuania,
however, for large enterprises with more than 100 employees this group represents 4% of the
enterprises. Financial owners dominated 4% of the manufacturing enterprises.  This percentage
was lower for other branches. Foreign owners dominated in 8% of the enterprises, slightly more
in small than in large enterprises, and slightly more in mining and wood, manufacturing and trade
than in other branches.
Looking at the capital structure for the data from the early years the most striking
difference between the different owner groups in industrial enterprises is the fact that insider
owned and especially employee owned enterprises have a relatively low nominal capital or equity
per employee, see table 8.1-1. It is the same tendency although not so strong as in Estonia. State
owned, foreign owned and no majority companies have relatively high capital intensity. Turning
to construction and trade there is another pattern with insider owned companies around the
average of nominal capital per employee. Only management dominated enterprises have a slightly
lower nominal capital per employee. Looking at the total assets per employee, however, insider
owned companies in all the analyzed sectors follow to a high degree the pattern of the average
enterprise. This might indicate that in industry insiders and especially managers have been able to
get a majority of the shares at a relatively low price. It fits well to the fact, that insiders had the
first bid at the initial price.
For the 1998 data in the large sample the group of domestic persons including insider
ownership we again find the lowest capital intensity. This is especially the case for equity per
employee indicating that this group has taken over assets at a relatively low price. However, there
might be the same tendency for foreign owned enterprises with quite low equity per employee and
the highest asset value per employee.
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The number of non-owners among employees in the Lithuanian sample is relatively low
compared to the other countries (Jones and Mygind, 1998). 75% of the employees in the sample
were owners in July 1994. For the management staff the corresponding percentage were as high
as 87%. This low percentage of non-owners among the employees suggests that the Lithuanian
voucher system has helped employees as a group to overcome the problem of lack of capital. 
There is also a tendency for the percentage of non owners to be higher in large enterprises than
in smaller, the opposite result of the situation in Estonia. Finally, table 8.1-3 shows a strong
tendency for almost all categories of an increasing share of non-owners. In total for both
manufacturing, construction and trade the share of owners fall to 61% in July 1996.
Figure 8.1-4 show the share of foreign ownership in different ownership groups. In 174
or 3.3% of the enterprises dominated by domestic persons there is a minority holding of foreign
capital. The similar number for ownership by financial enterprises is 6.6% and by non financial
enterprises 12.4%. For state enterprises the numbers are 2.6%. Domination by foreigners is made
by 50% or less of the share capital in 94 enterprises and by a clear majority in 496 enterprises.
Figure 8.1-5 shows the share of ownership by financial enterprises in different ownership
groups. In 196 or 3.7% of the enterprises dominated by domestic persons there is a minority
holding owned by financial enterprises. The similar number for ownership by non financial
enterprises is 6.8%. For state enterprises the numbers are 3.3% and for foreign dominated
enterprises 4.4%.  Domination by financial enterprises is made by 50% or less of the share capital
in 27 enterprises and by a clear majority in 124 enterprises.
8.2 Dynamics of ownership - Lithuania
The dynamics of ownership is illustrated through the transition matrices shown in the
figures 8.2-1-7 . Figure 8.2-1 for industry shows a strong tendency of a fall in the number of
enterprises with majority insider ownership and employee dominance. The number is more than
halved from July 1994 to July 1995. From July 1994 to July 1996, 40% of the 53 employee owned
enterprises have changed to outside domestic ownership, 19% to no majority and 6% to
management ownership. A few enterprises have changed to more employee ownership. Most of
these changes took place from 1994 to 1995. It is worth noting that there do not seem to be the
same tendency in Lithuania as in Estonia with stability for employee ownership in small
enterprises. All size groups show a steep fall from 1994 to 1996. Outside ownership has increased
both for foreign ownership which increased from 6 to 18 and domestic ownership which increased
from 124 to 168. The number of industrial enterprises with insider majority with management
dominance is relatively stable. However, only 4 or 33% have stayed in this category for both 1994
and 1996. In total the Lithuanian industrial enterprises show very dynamic changes. About 40%
of the enterprises (excluding no answers) have changed category in the period of two years.
For construction and trade 18% of the enterprises have changed category during one year
from July 1995 to July 1996, figure 21. Employee dominated insider owned enterprises seem to
be more stable than in industry. However, in the same period from 1995 to 1996 employee
ownership was also rather stable in industry. In construction and trade the number falls from 20
to 18. Most changes are recorded for no majority enterprises falling from 24 to 18 with most
enterprises going to domestic outside ownership. The number of foreign owned enterprises
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increases from 0 to 2.
The transition matrices in figure 8.2-3 and figure 8.2-4 show the strong tendency away
from employee ownership. For the industrial enterprises in figure 8.2-3, only 23 are shifting to
more, while 137 are shifting to lower employee ownership and 139 are unchanged - a rate of
change of 54%. There is especially a strong change away from majority employee ownership
falling from 30 to 8 and enterprises with 30-50% employee ownership falling from 79 to 42. The
categories with low employee ownership are increasing. A similar tendency can be observed in
figure 8.2-4 with enterprises in construction and trade. 7 enterprises have had increasing, 31
falling, and 101 have had constant employee ownership in the period July 1995 to July 1996, a rate
of change of 27%. For industrial enterprises there is from July 1994 to July 1995 a tendency for
increasing management ownership (56 up, 36 down and 208 constant, a rate of change of 31%)
while in the following year from 1995 to 1996 there is stability with 33 up, 31 down and 231
constant, 22% rate of change. The stability from 1995 to 1996 is also seen for management
ownership in the sample for construction and trade with 14 up, 13 down and 112 constant, 19%
rate of change.
We do not have so detailed ownership information after July 1996. However, we can
combine most of the enterprises from the small sample with the large sample like it is done in
figure 8.2-5 showing some developments in ownership for the period July 1996 to ultimo 1997.
For the large sample figure 8.2-6 shows the dynamics during the year 1997. Both figures show
relatively low dynamics. The privatization is evident in both figures. The strange movements from
private to state might be tax-arrears converted to shares. Foreign dominance is especially
increasing by takeovers of private domestic enterprises, and foreign dominance is increasing with
12% in 1997. A more detailed picture of the development in the foreign ownership shares can be
seen in figure 8.2-7 showing that foreign takeovers is often a gradual process
8.3 Ownership and some indicators of economic performance
We have data for the small sample for the early years 1992-1995 and for the large sample
for 1996 and 1997. Management ownership had a higher incidence in small enterprises, but
employee ownership had a quite high frequency both in small and large enterprises. The data for
the very early years do not indicate a bias in direction of low capital-intensity for insider owned
enterprises as was the case in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania high captial intensity has not
blocked takeovers by employees, because vouchers combined with a preferential price favored the
group of employees. There does not seem to be a selection bias according to profitability (Mygind
1997a p. 37).
Early data from 1993-94 show that the highest growth of sales (lowest decrease) is found
in foreign owned enterprises, but also management owned enterprises are doing better than the
rest while employee owned enterprises follows the average, domestic outside owned enterprises
are below the average (Mygind 1997a). These results fits well with the 1997 data, figure 8.3-2.
Foreign owned enterprises have again the highest growth in sales. Enterprises owned by domestic
persons are also doing relatively well, while enterprises owned by domestic enterprises, especially
those with financial ownership, are underperforming.
The early data on employment adjustment give some indicators of a somewhat hesitant
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adjustment process in employee-owned enterprises (Mygind 1997 p. 33).  For the 1997 data the
growth in employment is negative for the median enterprise owned by state or domestic
enterprises. Employment is constant for the median domestic owned enterprise, but growing 8%
for the median of foreign owned companies.
A cross section analysis on factor productivity levels for the early data show no clear
tendencies of variation between owner groups (Jones and Mygind 1999b).  Averages for the early
data indicates that insider owned enterprises have quite high labor-productivity (Mygind 1997,
p.34). The results from the large sample show that foreign owned enterprises have the highest
labor-productivity for the year 1997, while enterprises owned by domestic companies, especially
financially owned,  have low labor-productivity, see table 8.3-2.
For the early data foreign owned enterprises have clearly the highest wage-level, but also
employee owned enterprises have for 1994 a wage level above the average (Mygind 1997 p. 36).
In the 1997 data foreign owned enterprises have higher salary per employee than the average,
enterprises owned by domestic persons are lower than the average, see figure 8.3-2.
In the early data employee owned enterprises are doing well compared to other groups
both in relation to profit margin and return on assets. Management owned enterprises are around
the average (Mygind 1997, p 38). Foreign owned enterprises have quite low return on asset. For
the 1997 data the return on assets is relatively high for both foreign owned enterprises and
enterprises owned by domestic persons. For domestic persons, however, this is partly due to the
quite low value of assets. The profit-margin is somewhat lower than for foreign dominated
enterprises.
The early data confirms the observations from Estonia and Latvia that insiders have
relatively low bank loans (Mygind 1997, p 40). The data for the capital structure in the large
Lithuanian sample ultimo 1997, figure 8.3-1, show that foreign owned enterprises have the highest
debt/equity ratio. Surprisingly enterprises dominated by domestic financial companies have a
relatively low debt equity, only state owned enterprises have a lower ratio, while enterprises
owned by domestic persons are higher than the average. Most of this debt is short run loans for
all the domestic firms, while for most of the foreign companies long loans is higher than short
loans for most of the enterprises. Bank loans are quite rare, the median for bank loans per
employee is 0 for all owner groups. Domestic financial enterprises have the highest proportion of
enterprises with bank loans - state owned enterprises and firms owned by domestic persons are
on the low side, while also enterprises dominated by foreigners and by domestic non financial
enterprises are higher than the average.
The 1994 data on investments per employee show that employee- and management owned
enterprises have relatively low investment levels, while foreign and domestic outside-owned
enterprises are higher than the average (Mygind, 1997 p. 41). The 1997 data show that enterprises
with high investment are mainly found in the groups owned by foreigners and by domestic persons.
Most of the state owned enterprises and enterprises owned by other enterprises have negative
netinvestment, see figure 8.3-2.
In general the 1997-data shows that enterprises dominated by financial ownership have low
growth in sales, low productivity and negative netinvestment. This indicates that many of these
enterprises have been taken over by banks because of economic problems. Financial enterprises
64
do not seem to have a strong role as owners in Lithuania. On the other hand financial take-overs
of firms in economic crisis can be taken as an indicator that creditors try to enforce financial
discipline through such takeovers. In this way financial enterprises can play an important role for
corporate governance by enforcing their rights as creditors.
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Appendix 8.
Figure 8.1-1  Lithuania: Ownershipstructure July 1994, industry -
size, capital intensity, time of privatization.
Majority
outsiders insiders
frequency
row percent
State
foreign>dom domestic>f managers>e employees>m
no
majo-
rity
no
an-
swer
total
TOTAL 70 (20) 6 (2)  124 (35) 12 (3) 53 (15) 60 (17)31  (9) 356 (100)
EMPLOYEES
5-19
20-99
100-199
200-499
500-
1       
1 (33)
15 (32)
15 (18)
18 (18)
20 (18)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (2)
4 (4)
0   (0)
11 (23)
36 (44)
38 (37)
39 (35)
1 (33)
0   (0)
1   (1)
2   (2)
8   (7)
0   (0)
4   (9)
12 (15)
19 (19)
18 (16)
0   (0)
3   (6)
15 (18)
21 (21)
21 (19)
 6      
1(33)
14(30)
4  (5)
3  (3)
3  (3)
7         
3 (100)
47 (100)
83 (100)
103 (100)
113 (100)
average  1994
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
496
113
221
596
753
401
750
1084
616
168
327
753
1092
418
798
1831
639
207
322
737
657
194
311
793
333
70
94
131
601
153
304
722
BRANCHES
mining, wood
manufacturing
manufacturing
41 (24)
18 (14)
11 (22)
2 (1)
3 (2)
1 (2)
40 (23)
62 (48)
22 (44)
5 (3)
4 (3)
3 (6)
30 (17)
17 (13)
6 (12)
43 (25)
14 (11)
3   (6)
3     
14 (8)
10 (8)
4 (8)
3         
175 (100)
128 (100)
50 (100)
assets/employee
average  1994
25% quartile
median
75% quart.
29867
9996
22232
37712
32838
18876
32004
39881
16699
 8545
13217
20711
31853
12006
24730
51948
20664
9141
17096
26427
27689
14872
21815
28731
21380
4505
8394
24638
23002
9083
16856
27345
equity/employee
average 1994
25% quartile
median
75% quart.
8669
768
3290
8571
5839
1738
3986
8714
2769
503
1319
3071
2403
315
1529
4398
1895
386
738
1733
7424
678
2698
5566
-
-
-
-
4695
497
1524
4236
year of
privatization
1991 (own 94)
1992 (own 94)
1993 (own 94)
1994 (own 95)
1995 (own 96)
total
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (2)
1 (1)
3(20)
6
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (3)
3 (4)
0 (0)
5
3(100)
56 (70)
42 (50)
34 (49)
7 (47)
142
0 (0)
0 (0)
7 (8)
0 (0)
1 (7)
8
0   (0)
14 (18)
9 (11)
7 (10)
3 (20)
33
0   (0)
8 (10)
21 (25)
21 (30)
1   (7)
51
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (6)
0 (0)
4
3 (100)
78 (100)
83 (100)
70 (100)
15 (100)
249 (100)
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Figure 8.1-2 Lithuania: Ownership structure July 1995,
construction and trade,  size, capital intensity, time of privatization.
Majority
outsiders insiders
Frequency
row percent
State
foreign>domdomestic>f managers>e employees>m
no
majo-
rity
no
an-
swer
total
TOTAL 13 (9) 0 (0) 50 (34) 37 (26) 20 (14) 24 (17) 1 (1) 145 (100)
EMPLOYEES
5-19
20-99
100-199
200-
1 (17)
3   (6)
5 (12)
3   (8)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (17)
20 (37)
15 (37)
11 (28)
2 (33)
16 (30)
9 (22)
9 (23)
1 (17)
7 (13)
3   (7)
9  23)
1 (17)
8 (15)
9 (22)
6 (15)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (3)
0 (0)
5         
6 (100)
54 (100)
41 (100)
39 (100)
average
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
151
78
136
211
-
-
-
-
134
65
134
183
173
72
106
208
214
73
172
251
173
48
116
206
383
-
-
-
165
68
124
213
BRANCHES
construction
trade
9 (12)
4   (6)
0 (0)
0 (0)
26 (34)
24 (36)
18 (23)
19 (29)
11 (14)
9 (14)
13 (17)
11 (17)
0 (0)
1 (1)
77 (100)
68 (100)
total assets
/employee
average
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
81609
14519
19345
34549
-
-
-
-
31434
14959
22707
36364
30174
10390
16000
38579
23078
14361
19727
24503
33641
15324
24943
36857
9022
-
-
-
34965
14362
21924
35522
nom. capital
/employee
average
25% quartile
median
75% quartile
4682
1398
3243
6206
-
-
-
-
4367
244
1302
6466
3090
588
1399
3250
4457
505
1097
7455
8794
632
2272
10497
-
-
-
-
4818
492
1622
5589
year of
privatization     
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
total
0  (0)
2  (7)
0  (0)
2  (5)
0  (0)
4  (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (50)
11 (37)
15 (38)
13 (33)
5 (31)
45 (36)
1 (50)
9 (30)
13 (33)
10 (26)
3 (19)
36 (29)
0   (0)
4 (13)
3   (8)
9 (23)
4 (25)
20 (16)
0   (0)
4 (13)
8 (21)
5 (13)
4 (25)
21 (17)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (100)
30 (100)
39 (100)
39 (100)
16 (100)
126 (100)
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Figure 8.1-3 Lithuania: Ownershipstructure (dominant),
Ultimo 1997  - size, branches, year of registration
State domestic
persons
domestic
financial
domestic
non-fin.
foreign total
Employees      N
-19
20-99
100-199
200-
982 (13)
176   (6)
488 (14)
154 (24)
164 (34)
5222 (72)
2251 (82)
2361 (69)
383 (60)
227 (48)
151  (2)
30  (1)
73  (2)
28  (4)
20  (4)
338 (5)
65 (2)
204 (6)
36 (6)
33 (7)
590 (8)
216 (8)
305 (9)
35 (6)
34 (7)
7283 (100)
2738  (38)
3431  (47)
363    (9)
478    (7)
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
194
25
59
129
56
14
23
48
104
22
53
130
91
22
39
86
67
15
27
53
78
15
26
60
BRANCHES  N
agricult. fishing
mining wood
manufacturing
construction
trade
restaurants
transport
service
water supply
1245 (17)
325 (78)
20   (4)
146 (10)
50   (6)
164   (7)
43 (13)
85 (14)
303 (39)
109 (90)
5222 (69)
75 (18)
344 (75)
1068 (71)
773 (86)
1887 (78)
237 (72)
444 (73)
386 (49)
8   (7)
151   (2)
5   (1)
12   (3)
53   (4)
18   (2)
34   (1)
8   (2)
8   (1)
11   (1)
2   (2)
338   (4)
2   (0)
26   (6)
97   (6)
36   (4)
106   (4)
12   (4)
28   (5)
29   (4)
2   (2)
590   (8)
8   (2)
56 (12)
142   (9)
17   (2)
238 (10)
28   (9)
47   (8)
54   (7)
0   (0)
7546 (100)
415 (100)
458 (100)
1506 (100)
894 (100)
2429 (100)
328 (100)
612 (100)
783 (100)
121 (100)
Figure 8.1-4 Foreign ownership by dominant owners - ultimo 1997
frequency
row %
State domestic
persons
domestic
financial
domestic
non-fin.
foreign total
0% 956  (15) 5048  (78) 141    (2) 296    (5) 0     (0) 6441 (100)
1-10% 16  (17) 62  (66) 4     (4) 12  (13) 0     (0) 94 (100)
11-30% 4    (5) 54  (70) 2     (3) 16  (21) 1     (1) 77 (100)
31-50% 6    (3) 58  (33)  4     (2) 14    (8) 93   (53) 175 (100)
51-99% 0    (0) 0    (0)  0     (0) 0    (0) 286 (100) 286 (100)
100% 0    (0) 0    (0) 0     (0) 0    (0) 210 (100) 210 (100)
total 982  (13) 5222  (72) 151    (5) 338    (5) 590     (8) 7283 (100)
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Figure 8.1-5 Ownership by financial enterprises by dominant owners-ult 97
frequency
row %
State domestic
persons
domestic
financial
domestic
non-fin.
foreign total
0% 949  (14) 5026  (73) 0     (0) 315    (5) 565     (8) 6855 (100)
1-10% 16  (15) 69  (63) 1     (1) 10    (9) 13   (12) 109 (100)
11-30% 13  (11) 85  (74) 1     (1) 9    (8) 7    (6) 115 (100)
31-50% 4    (5) 42  (53) 25   (31) 4    (5) 5    (6) 80 (100)
51-99% 0    (0) 0    (0) 96 (100) 0    (0) 0    (0) 96 (100)
100% 0    (0) 0    (0) 28 (100) 0    (0) 0    (0) 28 (100)
total 982  (13) 5222  (72) 151    (5) 338    (5) 590   (8) 7283 (100)
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Figure 8.2-1  Transition matrix Lithuania - industry
                   majority July 1994 by July 1996
Majority July 1996
outsiders insidersmajority
July 1994
State
foreign domesticmanagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
state 47
(67)
2
(3)
9
(13)
1
(1)
2
(3)
4
(6)
5
(7)
70
(100)
outsider
foreign>domestic
0
(0)
4
(67)
2
(33)
 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
6
(100)
outsider
domestic>foreign
0
(0)
8
(6)
 98 
(79)
4
(3)
2
(2)
2
(2)
10
(8)
124
(100)
insider
managers>employees
0
(0)
1
(8)
3
(25)
4
(33)
1
(8)
2
(17)
1
(8)
12
(100)
insider
employees>managers
1
(2)
1
(2)
21
(40)
 3
(6)
14
(26)
10
(19)
3
(6)
53
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
2
(3)
32
(53)
1
(2)
3
(5)
16
(27)
6
(10)
60
(100)
no answer 2
(6)
0
(0)
3
(10)
1
(3)
2
(6)
1
(3)
22
(71)
31
(100)
total  July 1994 70
(20)
6
(2)
124
(35)
12
(3)
53
(15)
60
(17)
31
(9)
356
(100)
total  July 1995 59
(17)
9
(3)
148
(42)
14
(4)
25
(7)
53
(15)
48
(13)
356
(100)
total  July 1996 50
(14)
18
(5)
168
(47)
14
(4)
24
(7)
35
(10)
47
(13)
356
(100)
Figure 8.2-2  Transition matrix Lithuania - construction and trade
         majority July 1995 by July 1996
majority July 1996
outsiders insidersmajority
July 1995
state
foreign domesticmanagers employees
no
majo-
rity
no
answer
total
July
1995
state 10
(77)
0
(0)
2
(15)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(8)
13
(100)
outsider
foreign>domestic
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
-
outsider
domestic>foreign
0
(0)
2
(4)
43
(86)
2
(4)
0
(0)
0
(0)
3
(6)
50
(100)
insider
managers>employees
0
(0)
0
(0)
2
(5)
31
(84)
2
(5)
1
(3)
1
(3)
37
(100)
insider
employees>managers
0
(0)
0
(0)
2
(10)
1
(5)
15
(75)
2
(10)
0
(0)
20
(100)
no majority 0
(0)
0
(0)
6
(25)
2
(8)
1
(4)
15
(63)
0
(0)
24
(100)
no answer 0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
1
(100)
1
(100)
total  July 1996 10
(7)
2
(1)
55
(38)
36
(25)
18
(12)
18
(12)
6
(4)
145
(100)
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Figure 8.2-3  Transition matrix Lithuania - industry
  degrees of employee ownership, July 1994  by July 1996
July 1994 July 1996
Employee shares0% 1-10% 11-30%31-50%51-99%100%
  total
0% 20 (83) 2   (8) 2   (8) 0   (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 24 (100)
1-10% 3  (4)65 (88) 5   (7) 0   (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 74 (100)
11-30% 2  (2)43 (43)48 (48) 5   (5) 1 (1) 0 (0) 99 (100)
31-50% 2  (3)15 (20)29 (38)28 (37) 2 (3) 0 (0) 76 (100)
51-99% 1  (4)  5 (20) 8 (32) 9 (36) 2 (8) 0 (0) 25 (100)
100% 0  (0) 0   (0) 1(100) 0   (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (100)
total July 1994 27  (8)84 (26) 105
(32)
79 (24) 29 (9) 1 (0) 325 (100)
total July 1995 25  (8)105(34
)
111
(36)
53 (17) 14 (5) 0 (0) 308 (100)
total July 1996 28  (9)130(43
)
93 (31)42 (14) 6 (2) 0 (0) 299 (100)
Figure 8.2-4  Transition matrix Lithuania - construction and trade
         degrees of employee ownership, July 1995 byJuly 1996
July 1995 July 1996
Employee shares0% 1-10% 11-30%31-50%51-99%100%
  total
0% 8 (80) 0   (0) 2 (20) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 10 (100)
1-10% 0   (0)34 (95) 1   (3) 0   (0) 1   (3) 0   (0) 36 (100)
11-30% 0   (0)14 (21)42 (72) 2   (3) 0   (0) 0   (0) 58 (100)
31-50% 0   (0) 1   (0) 7 (28) 16 (64) 1   (4) 0   (0) 25 (100)
51-99% 0   (0) 0   (0) 3 (30) 2 (20) 5 (50) 0   (0) 10 (100)
100% 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0   (0) 0 (100)
total July 1996 8   (6)49 (33)55 (38)20 (14) 7   (5) 0   (0)145 (100)
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Figure  8.2-5 Lithuania, transition matrix: July 1996 by ult. 1997
dominant ultimo 1997
Dominant
July 1996
state foreign domesti
c
persons
domesti
c
financial
domesti
c
non-fin.
Total
State 46
(68)
1
(1)
19
(28)
0
(0)
2 
(3)
68
(100)
Outsider
foreign>domestic
2
(13)
9
(56)
4
(25)
0
(0)
1
(6)
16
(100)
Outsider
domestic>foreign
13
(5)
3
(1)
152
(67)
36
(15)
31
(13)
235
(100)
Insider
managers>employees
1
(2)
0
(0)
53
(96)
1
(2)
0
(0)
55
(100)
Insider
employees>managers
2
(4)
1
(2)
44
(92)
0
(0)
1
(2)
48
(100)
total 
ultimo 1997
64
(15)
14
(3)
272
(64)
37
(9)
35
(8)
422
(100)
Figure  8.2-6 Lithuania, transition matrix: primo by ultimo 1997
Dominant ultimo 1997
Dominant
primo 1997
State foreign domestic
persons
domestic
financial
domestic
non-fin.
Total
State 778
(87)
8
(1)
70
(87)
10
(1)
26
(3)
892
(100)
Foreign 0
(0)
316
(94)
17
(5)
0
(0)
2
(1)
335
(100)
Domestic 57
(1)
50
(1)
3482
(89)
121
(3)
218
(6)
3928
(100)
total 
January 1998
835
(16)
374
(7)
3569
(69)
131
(3)
246
(5)
5155
(100)
Fig 8.2-7 Lithuania,  foreign ownership, primo by ultimo 1997
primo 1997 ultimo 1997
foreign share 0% 1-10% 11-30%31-50%51-99%100%   total
0% 4550(98)23  (0) 24 (1) 17 (0) 26  (1) 6   (0)4646 (100)
1-10% 6 (12) 44(85) 0   (0) 1   (2) 1   (2) 0   (0) 52  (100)
11-30% 8 (15)  6 (12) 30 (58) 5 (10) 1   (2) 2   (4) 52  (100)
31-50% 6   (5) 2   (2) 8   (6)100(76)  13(10) 0   (0) 131 (100)
51-99% 4   (2)  3   (2) 0   (0) 4   (2)161(90) 6   (3)  178 (100)
100% 1   (1) 0   (0) 1   (1) 0   (0)  4   (4) 87 (94) 93  (100)
total ult. 1997 4575(89)78   (2)63   (1)127 (3)206 (4)103  (2)5152 (100)
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Figure 8.3-1 Lithuania: Ownershipstructure (dominant),
ultimo 1997 -  capital-structure
state domestic
persons
domestic
financial
domestic
non-fin.
foreign total
equity             N
/employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
979
73899
7410
16461
42875
5222
11737
909
3844
11771
151
33111
4193
14570
42813
338
31309
2454
11519
30773
590
45551
917
8000
32851
7280
24188
1085
5488
16686
total assets      N
/employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
977
95873
16227
28549
63304
5222
44952
10406
22046
47297
151
63500
19485
40125
82279
338
76966
16326
33360
73827
590
176880
29571
73487
157731
7288
64354
12253
25669
57450
debt/equity     N
average     
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
977
3.56
0.16
0.58
1.50
5222
27.37
0.91
3.47
13.54
151
14.79
0.31
1.16
4.61
338
26.15
0.37
1.37
7.75
590
64.32
1.21
5.48
45.28
7278
26.85
0.63
2.61
11.35
short/long loans
average           N
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
173
12.21
0.54
1.55
5.01
1186
136.96
0.68
1.99
7.07
38
12.96
0.55
1.45
4.77
94
2234.37
1.04
2.87
7.47
240
13.04
0.34
0.96
4.16
1731
218.48
0.58
1.78
6.12
bankcredits    N
/employee 1000 lat
average
50% median
75% quartile
90% quantile
95% quantile
982
9661
0
0
2173
10127
5222
3365
0
0
6067
15000
151
7818
0
2637
18840
38392
338
11241
0
1295
14647
36656
590
9028
0
0
10000
32353
7283
5131
0
0
6147
17026
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Figure 8.3-2  Lithuania: Ownership (dominant), ult. 1997 - performance
state domestic
persons
domestic
financial
domestic
non-fin.
foreign total
value added/
employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
981
-1855
-6547
-1123
3953
5222
3293
-6720
229
11185
151
-2463
-13806
-2334
5855
338
962
-10535
351
10248
590
16287
-8605
8514
45828
7282
3424
-7053
152
11150
sales growth N
average        %
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
832
17.3
-6.7
9.7
26.5
3561
84.4
-5.0
20.8
64.8
131
24.0
-19.3
4.2
28.6
246
46.1
-11.3
9.8
48.9
372
13827
4.06
31.9
79.2
5142
1064
-5.4
17.1
57.2
profitmargin
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
975
1.8
-2.8
7.8
18.5
5215
13.6
2.9
13.4
25.3
150
9.3
2.1
14.4
23.8
338
8.8
5.3
15.7
24.3
587
20.4
8.2
18.1
31.7
7265
12.2
2.5
13.4
24.8
return o assets
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
90% quantile
95% quantile
977
0.6
-4.6
0.8
6.7
17.3
26.7
5222
7.9
-2.0
5.6
20.3
40.9
54.9
151
-1.4
-5.5
0.5
10.1
18.2
22.7
338
0.1
-4.2
1.4
14.1
30.0
36.0
590
3.9
-3.6
5.4
19.2
33.9
44.7
7278
6.0
-2.7
4.2
17.7
36.7
51.1
salary per
employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
90% quantile
95% quantile
982
9667
6339
8247
11163
14894
18221
5222
7444
4020
5779
8790
13034
16608
151
9253
6168
8296
10813
14318
15634
338
9301
5620
7819
11928
16547
18857
590
13078
5640
9374
16775
28182
35788
7283
8324
4404
6488
9872
14578
18916
netinvestment/
employee 1000 lat
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
831
7726
-1235
-252
470
3524
2439
-453
191
2600
130
-2197
-2786
-492
804
242
-188
-1565
-97
1611
371
15927
-826
1003
6612
5098
4039
-641
71
2388
growth in     N
employment
average
25% quartile
50% median
75% quartile
835
-7.3
-17.9
-6.7
0.0
3569
13.4
-15.3
0.0
21.7
131
-9.7
-25.0
-10.2
0.0
246
6.0
-23.3
-8.7
7.7
374
30.3
-6.4
8.0
35.9
5155
10.3
-16.0
-1.7
16.1
74
9. Summary on ownership analysis and economic performance
The privatization process and the results on ownership, corporate governance, and
economic performance have many similarities between the three Baltic countries, but there are also
differences depending on specific policies and the development of the institutional framework. In
this summary we will start each point by outlining the general trend and then go deeper into some
of the main differences between the countries. We have already summarized the main elements in
the privatization process in section 5. This section will focus on ownership and economic
performance or restructuring, but also make some connections back to the specific privatization
models and institutional conditions in each country. We will follow the division in three
subsections: 1) ownership structure after privatization/establishment of new firms, 2) ownership
dynamics after privatization, 3) governance structures and economic performance/restructuring.
9.1 Ownership structure after privatization/establishment of new firms
The ownership structure now existing in the Baltic countries is both a result of
privatization/start of new enterprises and of dynamic change in ownership after the establishment
as private entities. It is seldom possible to make a clear distinction between de novo enterprises
and privatized enterprises, but in general most of the small enterprises with less than 20 employees
are started as new starts although often with some privatized assets. On the other hand most large
private enterprises with 100 or more employees are privatized. In between it is more difficult to
distinguish the group of medium sized enterprises, and only in some cases we have been able to
make a clear distinction in the analysis.
The general trend in all three countries is that management ownership is dominant for small
enterprises, both for new started and for privatized. Like in the West, most small enterprises in
trade, small manufacturing etc. have been started by a sole proprietor. The new cooperatives have
been a special way of early private start ups giving the broader group of employees a more formal
role in the ownership-structure, but we assume that most of these enterprises very quickly
transformed to management owned enterprises. In the privatization process managers of enterprise
of small enterprises or more often smaller branches of a larger enterprise have got relatively good
possibilities to take-over their units. This was especially the case in the early period of transition
in all three countries. In some cases, especially in Estonia and Latvia broader, employee ownership
were encouraged in the early small privatization. In Lithuania, on the contrary, in privatization of
small enterprises there were less advantages for employees than was the case for large
privatization in relation to the LIPSP program.
The result on ownership structure was a very high proportion of manager owned small
enterprises especially in Estonia and Latvia and a somewhat lower proportion in Lithuania.
Ownership of a broader group of employees is also found in small enterprises, but this type of
ownership was more evenly distributed also to cover medium and large-sized enterprises. This
brings the total proportion of insider ownership to a quite high level compared with international
standard. Thus in January 1995 it is estimated that in 30%-60% of the private companies in the
three countries insiders own at least 50% of the firm. The percentage is highest in Latvia and
apparently lowest in Lithuania, but in Lithuania the number are relatively high in large companies
and insiders own shares in nearly all companies including those which do not have a single group
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owning the majority. In the industrial enterprises in Lithuania around 75% of the employees own
shares. In Estonia, we find an incidence of employee ownership, with one in four employees
owning shares in private firms in 1995.
In Lithuania, nearly all enterprises have at least an element of employee ownership, the
broad group of employees has a quite strong position versus management, and there are fewer
non-owners among the employees than in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuanian industry the
employees dominate managers in relation to ownership. In Estonia and Latvia the two types of
ownership have about the same weight when measured in January 1995. However, in Latvia there
is a higher proportion of enterprises with majority insider ownership than in Lithuania.
Foreign ownership has been most important in relation to some of the very large
privatization in all three countries. However, this type of privatization started some years earlier
in Estonia than in Latvia and are first in these years taking off in Lithuania. This is a major reason
why foreign ownership up till 1996 is very important in Estonia while minor important in Latvia
and of negligible importance in Lithuania. Because of the proximity to Finland and the general
international openness Estonia has also seen a quite high proportion of foreign ownership in small
enterprises especially in trade. There are some tendencies in this direction also in Latvia while in
Lithuania the share of foreign ownership is lower than in the two Northern countries.
By 1996, in Lithuania, a relatively high proportion of enterprises are categorized as Ano
majority@, no single group - state, outsiders or insiders - have the majority of the shares. This is
mainly because the state kept a substantial minority stake in many enterprises in the LIPSP-
privatization, and the following process of selling out these shareholdings has been relatively slow
up to 1998. In both Estonia and Latvia there is a considerable concentration of shares at a single
group of owners leaving only 2-6% of the private enterprises in the category of Ano m jority@.
One of the main barriers for establishing insider ownership is the lack of capital. Foreign
investors on the other hand have a strong advantage in access to capital. Special advantages for
insiders in the privatization process might change this relation. In the Baltics this was the case in
Lithuania. In Estonia and Latvia there is a strong tendency for a relatively low capital intensity in
insider owned enterprises. This is especially the case when measured as nominal capital per
employee, but this is also the tendency for total assets per employee. Here is a significant
difference from the situation in Lithuania. Here, total assets per employee is about the same in
insider as in outsider owned companies. Nominal capital per employee in employee owned
enterprises in industry is lower than for other ownership types, but the tendency is much weaker
than it was the case in Estonia and Latvia. It is probably the higher level of support for employees
in Lithuania which explains this difference. In the other countries insiders including the broad
group of employees could only afford a take-over when the price reflected in the nominal capital
per employee was relatively low.
9.2 Ownership dynamics after privatization or start up
The initial ownership structure after privatization cannot be expected to fit to the long run
preferences of different stakeholders and to the most efficient distribution of ownership on
different owner groups. Therefore, the dynamics of ownership structures after privatization is very
important. However, trading of shares, enforcement of ownership rights and other elements in the
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institutional framework for corporate governance might hamper the dynamic adjustment resulting
in a high degree of inertia in the ownership structure.
In fact some degree of inertia characterize all three countries. Except for the continuing
privatization transferring ownership from the state to the other groups there is only little dynamics
between the broadly defined private ownership categories such as insiders, domestic outsiders and
foreign outsider. In this respect we find somewhat more dynamics in Estonia than is the case in
the two other countries. However, the main change takes place within the group of insiders. In all
three countries there is a strong dynamic trend of transferring broad employee ownership to
management ownership.
Especially in Estonia and Lithuania the data show a quite fast change in ownership. The
dynamics are not so profound in Latvia, however, here the survey covers only 167 enterprises and
they were asked about historic data, implying a bias in the direction of stability. Thus, our
conclusion is that there has probably been a rather dynamic change also in Latvia. There is a
tendency, most pronounced in Estonia, especially for change away from employee ownership in
large enterprises. Also the group of enterprises with Ano majority@ is falling in all three countries.
The tendency away from employee ownership can also be found on the personal level in
the enterprises. The number of non-owning employees is increasing in all three countries, except
for small enterprises in Estonia. This confirms the tendency for higher stability of employee
ownership in small enterprises.
Dynamics with foreign owners taking over privately owned enterprises can also be found
in the material although the frequency is rather low. Here we find some indication of gradual
takeovers to a higher extent that takeovers in one blow.
9.3 Ownership structures and economic performance
The general conclusions in most theoretical literature on the relation between ownership
and economic performance / restructuring is that private performs better than state, outsiders
better than insiders, and within these groups: managers better than employees and foreigners better
than domestic investors. We can construct a scale like shown in figure 9.3-2.
Foreign ownership is considered to have the highest potential for efficient economic
performance and restructuring because of the access to capital, management skills, including
corporate governance abilities, and access to international business networks. All the companies
in the transition economies will meet strong barriers because of the lack of developed institutions
and high market uncertainty, but foreigners have an advantage because of their strong links to the
Western markets. This is the main advantage in relation to concentrated domestic outside
ownership.
Insider ownership on the other hand, and especially employee ownership, are considered
to have specific disadvantages because employees might have special objectives of stable jobs and
high wages differing from profit maximization. They might lack the necessary management skills
and they have limited access to capital. Management ownership lies somewhat between employee
ownership and outside domestic ownership.
Figure  9.3-1 Theoretical predictions on efficiency for different owner groups
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However, before evaluating the actual performance of the different owner groups it must
be checked whether they have the same starting conditions. Foreign owned and management
owned enterprises are both the result of new start ups as well as privatizations, while broader
employee ownership are mainly the result of the privatization process. There are striking
differences concerning size and capital-intensity. Management ownership is especially found in
small enterprises, while employee ownership tend to be larger on average. Insider-ownership has
a quite low capital-intensity and foreign owned a rather high intensity and this concerns both
privatizations and start ups.
For privatized enterprises an important question is if specific owner groups can Askim the
cream@ when choosing the companies for takeovers while other groups are left with the low
performing enterprises. Data for the very early years before privatization are difficult to get and
not very reliable, but the indicators we have got show that there is no significant variation in the
level of pre-privatization profitability between owner groups. There is no evidence of Acream
skimming@. However, both the description of the early privatization process and the data on
capital-intensity gives some indications that insiders might have acquired their enterprises for a
relatively low price.
Looking at the economic results for different ownership structures quite strong general
trends in all countries are apparent, and these trends are both covering data for the small samples
of the early periods of transition, 1993-1995 and the large samples covering 1996 and 1997. A few
of the results are based on deeper econometric analysis, eg factor productivity for Estonian panel
data, but much of the results are based on simple descriptive data and shall be taken as preliminary,
see a summary of the result in figure 9.3.
The performance of foreign owned enterprises has the following characteristics:
- high capital-intensity from the start
- high sales per employee, and high growth rate of sales
- high export share (only documented for Estonia)
- high labor-productivity, measured as value added per employee,
  (difference to other groups lower when measured as sales per employee).
- high investment level
- relatively high level of debt and good access to bank loans
  (bank loans per employee much higher than for other ownergroups).
These figures show that foreign owned enterprises takes the lead when it concerns pro-
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active restructuring, that is developing new markets, new products and new production methods.
In this way the foreign owned companies used their advantages in relation to access to capital, and
market networks.
The other side of the coin is that foreign owned enterprises have:
- relatively high wages,
- higher cost of capital connected to the high capital-intensity
- factor productivity on the same level as insider ownership
- relatively low return on assets
The results indicate that the high level of assets have not yet paid off in foreign owned enterprises.
Profitability is lower and factor productivity on the same level as in insider owned enterprises
although foreign ownership have advantages in mangement and easy access to international market
networks.
If we look at insider owned enterprises, they seem to be examples of more defensive
restructuring:
- cutting down employment - sometimes somewhat sluggish,
- paying relatively low wages,
- having problems of getting bank-loans,
- implementing relatively low investments.
However, at the same time they can show relatively good results on:
- relatively high profitability and factor productivity.
This is related to relatively low capital-intensity at the starting point, but it also indicates that they
have done some restructuring and improved their use of scarce resources in a direction of higher
efficiency. Compared to domestic outside owned enterprises insider ownership are doing
surprisingly well in most measures across the three countries. This is the case for factor
productivity for  Estonia - no significant differences for the other countries can be found.
The most important deviation from the general trend is a somewhat higher capital-intensity
in employee owned enterprises in Lithuania. This was the result of the first stage privatization
program enabling employees to use vouchers for buying also relatively expensive enterprises. This
gave room for somewhat higher wages in these enterprises although still significantly lower than
in foreign owned enterprises.
For Lithuania we also have results from 1997 showing that enterprises owned dominantly
by financial companies are doing comparatively worse than other private enterprises. We take this
as a sign of banks taking over enterprises in economic crisis. In this way financial companies have
started to play a role a active creditors, but we se no strong signs that financial institutions play
an active role as owners in the economy in general.
10. Final remarks and perspectives
The three Baltic countries show many similarities in the development of new ownership
structures, but they have followed different paths of privatization and this has to some extent
resulted in differences in the structures of enterprise governance.
All three countries have a quite high degree of both management- and broader employee
ownership. This was especially the case for the early stage of privatization and concerned mainly
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small and medium sized enterprises with quite low capital intensity. For Lithuania also larger and
more capital intensive enterprises were taken over by a broad group of employees. Estonia has
been the fastest to promote significant foreign investment, but the other countries have been
catching up the latest years.
Some of the differences have been leveled off in the dynamic changes of ownership
structures. The strongest change has been managers taking over the ownership from other
employees. Although this process probably will continue for a longer period, the ownership
structure of all three Baltic countries will for the foreseeable future have a quite strong element
of employee ownership, and management ownership will continue to be on a high level especially
in small and medium sized enterprises. At the same time foreign ownership will play a strong and
increasing role in these small open economies.
How are the perspectives for restructuring under these conditions? The results on
economic performance suggests that not only foreign companies can implement restructuring, also
management- and employee owned enterprises undertakes restructuring although often more
defensive than is the case for foreign owned enterprises. The task for the Baltic economies will not
only be to further develop the cooperation with foreign investors, but also to improve the
conditions for the domestic owned enterprises to match the foreign advantages. This could be the
case in relation to access to capital, management training, building networks for exports etc..
Important for the development of a business infrastructure would be the development of the
financial markets in general and more specific the development of specific credit-schemes for small
and medium-sized enterprises. Also the development of institutions for management training,
management consulting and activities promoting exports-connections and international networks
for SMEs can be an important elements in restructuring the Baltic economies. Concerning
employee owned enterprises some consulting efforts could further develop their advantages in
relation to employee participation, motivation and alignment of the interests of owners and
employees.
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9.3 Summary on economic performance of different ownership groups
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
initial conditions
size
capital intensity
profitability
FO low
EO average, MO low
FO very high
EO and MO low
IO average, FO ?
FO average
IO smaller
FO very high
IO lower
no information
FO average
MO smaller
EO average
FO high
EO and MO average
FO and IO average
growth in sales FO high FO high FO and MO high
EO average, OO low
export share EO?, FO higher - -
employment changeFO highest growth
EO less reductions
EO and MO
higher increases
FO high growth
EO sluggish
adjustment
factor-productivity FO 19-21% higher
EO 13-24% higher
MO 15-31% higher
OO same level as SO
no significant
differences found
no significant
differences found
labor-productivity EO average FO highest FO highest
EO and MO high
wage level EO and MO lower
FO higher
FO highest
PO lower than SO
FO highest
EO and MO high
profitability,
(return on assets)
FO lower
EO and MO higher
FO lower
IO higher
FO low, later high
EO high, MO average
finance
debt/equity
bankloans/employee
EO and MO higher
FO higher
EO and MO lower
SO lower
FO average, IO high
FO highest
IO low
SO lowest
FO higher
FO higher
EO and MO lower
investment/employeeFO  highest
EO and MO average
FO highest
IO higher than OO
FO highest
special note financial owned firms
worst performance
FO=foreign owned, EO=employee, MO=management, IO=insider, OO=outside domestic, SO=state, PO=private
Based on Jones and Mygind 1999 a, b and c and Mygind 1997 a  and  b.
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